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Discharge In the "Law" of Arbitration
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
At common law a master was entitled to discharge his servant with-
out notice at any time, unless the contract of employment, either ex-
pressly or by implication, covered a specific term.' Even if the parties
intended the master-servant relationship to encompass a specific
term, the master retained the power, though not the right, to dis-
miss the servant without cause, thereby making himself liable in
damages for wrongful discharge.2 Since relatively few workers were
employed under individual contracts, the employer was able to dis-
charge at will for any reason and perhaps for no reason at all. So it
was until various factors, including the wish of employees to limit
this arbitrary and often capricious exercise of power by employers,3
led to union organization and the eventual passage of the National
Labor Relations Act in 1935.4 This act not only prohibited the dis-
charging of employees for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging
union membership,5 but also afforded an impetus to collective bargain-
ing by making a refusal to bargain in good faith an unfair labor prac-
tice.6 The wider scope thus afforded collective bargaining permitted
inclusion of grievance procedures in labor contracts which, in turn,
further circumscribed the employer's ability to discharge by requiring
the parties to try to resolve those differences occasioned by the dis-
charge. While this arrangement worked well in most instances, it was
inevitable that in some cases the parties would fail to agree upon a
terminal point in their grievance procedure. This, of course, presented
a substantial stumbling block to industrial self-government.
Impartial arbitration for the final settlement of labor disputes first
became accepted in those industries having a long history of collective
bargaining, such as the garment, coal-mining and printing industries.
1. Fidelity & Gas. Co. v. Gibson, 135 Ill. App. 290 (1907), aff'd, 232 Ill. 49, 83
N.E. 539 (1908); Summers v. Phenix Ins. Co., 50 Misc. 181, 98 N.Y. Supp. 226 (Sup.
Ct. 1906); 1 LABATr, MASTER AND SERvANT § 183 (2d ed. 1904).
2. Champion v. Hartshorne, 9 Conn. 564 (1833).
3. For a general treatment of why workers organize, see MACDONALD, LABOR PROB-
LEMS AND Tim AmERicAN ScENE ch. 20 (1938).
4. 49 Stat. 449-57 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1964).
5. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)(a) (3) (1964).
6. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 49 Stat. 453 (1035), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a) (3) (1964).
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Paralleling the growth of union organization, it rapidly spread to many
other mass-production enterprises in the middle and late 1930's.1 Its use
was encouraged and often required by the National War Labor Board
during World War 11,8 and during the postwar reconversion period
it became widely recognized as a viable means of preventing labor
strife.9 By 1947, a majority of collective bargaining agreements con-
tained arbitration clauses. The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in
that same year not only indicated congressional approval of the arbi-
tration process,10 but, in section 301," also afforded a means by which
both agreements to arbitrate12 and arbitration awards 13 could be en-
forced by the federal courts.
From the foregoing, it is clear that a "rule of law" has been sub-
stituted for the employer's unilateral right of action so well known
and often abused a scant thirty years ago. No longer is it in-
comprehensible that an unjustly discharged employee should be
afforded an effective measure of relief. 4 Today, he may dispute his
employer's action before the arbitrator, the National Labor Relations
Board, and, in some cases, before the courts.15 Of these several
tribunals, the arbitrator's is by far the most important both in terms of
the number of disputes decided, and because it affords certain ad-
vantages to the parties not offered by the Board or the courts. Before
proceeding to a discussion of discharge in the arbitral forum, however,
it would seem proper to relate the discharge grievance to the collective
bargaining process.
7. 1964 CCH LABOR LAw CouRsE 11 3517.
8. The Board's heavy caseload usually led it to refer grievance disputes back to the
parties for settlement by private arbitration, as well as to order the inclusion of arbitra-
tion clauses in all new contracts where the parties had failed to agree on a terminal
point in their grievance procedure. COPELOF, MIANAGEMENT-UNION ARIBITRAMON 3
(1948); TROTTA, LABoR AEB TRATO, 26 (1961).
9. Following the war, President Truman called a "Labor-Management Conference
to explore new ways of achieving industrial peace during reconversion to a peacetime
economy." Ibid. Though generally regarded as a failure, the 36 representatives of man-
agement and labor unanimously agreed that parties to a labor contract should provide
for an effective settlement of contract grievances by arbitration, thereby providing a
tremendous impetus to the already wide acceptance of the arbitration process. See The
President's National Labor Management Conference, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Division of
Labor Standards, Bulletin No. 77, 1946, p. 37.
10. Labor Management Relations Act § 201(b), 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 171(b) (1964).
11. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964): "Suits for violation of con-
tracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organiza-
tions, may be brought in any district court of the United States ....
12. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
13. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
14. See Boyer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 124 Fed. 246 (E.D. Mo. 1903).
15. See, e.g., Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 NJ. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963).
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B. Perspective
Discharge, while not the most important grievance in terms of
direct economic consequences, will often have a significant effect
upon the bargaining relationship as a whole. A single discharge
case, charged with emotion as it often is, will at times generate
stronger feelings on the part of the parties than "a wage case involv-
ing large numbers of employees and great sums of money." 16 In ad-
dition, the discharge case is more often taken to arbitration than any
other type of grievance dispute. Nor may the effect of the discharge
on the individual employee be overlooked. Although a reference to
discharge as "economic capital punishment" may be somewhat in-
accurate from an analytical standpoint, it is at least a useful de-
scriptive term to underline the importance of discharge to the
dischargee.
The discharge situation is unique not only because of its recurring
nature and its impact on both the bargaining relation and the individ-
ual, but also because of the body of principles that has grown out of
it. Categorizing grievance arbitration as being "solely a matter of
contract" is at best an overstatement, and this is particularly so when
dealing with the arbitration of discharge and discipline cases. Quite
simply, the collective bargaining agreement is more than a contract;
"it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the drafts-
men cannot wholly anticipate." 7 Accordingly, the purpose of the
principles of industrial discipline about to be discussed is to take up
where the draftsmen left off; to supply the rules which the parties were
unable to develop in the give and take of contract negotiation. In
short, these principles find their origins in the tenets of enlightened
personnel administration, and are designed to reconcile the individual
dischargee's interest with that of the industrial community. They
constitute a growing body of industrial common law, the contractual
source for which is the bargaining agreement's requirement of "just
cause" as a condition precedent for the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions.
II PROCEDUMi
A. The Requirement of "Just Cause"
This almost universal requirement may state simply "Employees
16. Ross, The Arbitration of Discharge Cases: What Happens After Reinstatement, in
CnmcAL IssuEs in Lnoa ARBrrmATON 21, 23 (Proceedings of the Tenth Annual
Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators 1957).
17. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra note 12, at 578;




may be discharged for just cause,"I" or it may be accompanied by
a list of dischargeable offenses,19 or embodied in a management pre-
rogative clause.20 It may also be expressed in synonymous terms
such as "proper cause," "obvious cause," or merely "cause." Even
if no such clause is contained in the agreement, it will in some
cases be implied absent a clear indication to the contrary, at least
by the better view.21 In any event, whether or not the employer
violated the contract by discharging the grievant without just cause
constitutes the central issue at the arbitration proceeding.
Just cause is not susceptible to definition, but its essence is indi-
cated as follows:
[It] excludes discharge for mere whim or caprice .... [It is] intended to
include those things for which employees have traditionally been fired....
[It] includes the traditional cause of discharge in the particular trade or
industry, the practices which develop in the day-to-day relations of manage-
ment and labor and most recently ... [it] includes the decision of the courts
and arbitrators .... 22
In its modern sense, just cause requires "not merely that the em-
ployer's action be free of capriciousness and arbitrariness but that
the employee's performance be so faulty or indefensible as to leave
the employer with no alternative except to discipline him."2  This
view of just cause rests upon the following theory:
18. Agreement between Revere Sugar Refinery and Local 400, United Packinghouse
Workers art. IX, 1964 CCH LABOR LAw CoURsE I[ 2952, at 3844 (effective Dec. 20,
1961).
19. "Employees shall be disciplined or discharged only for just cause, which shall
include, but not be limited to insubordination; violation of plant rules; failure to obey
instructions of supervisors; failure of an employee to properly perform his job in ac-
cordance with the Company standards .. " Agreement between American Thread Co.,
and Local 1386, Textile Workers art. IV, § 1, quoted in Local 1386, Textile Workers
v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894, 898 (4th Cir. 1961).
20. "Nothing in this Agreement shall be deemed to limit or restrict the Company in
any way in the exercise of the customary functions of management, including the right
to ...hire, suspend, discharge, or otherwise discipline an employee for violation of
[company] rules or other proper cause." Agreement between Todd Shipyards Corp.
and Local 6, IAM art. XXX, quoted in Todd Shipyards Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 333, 335
(1961) (Williams, J.).
21. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 25 Lab. Arb, 295, 300-01 (1955) (Boles, W.).
Contra, American Oil & Supply Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 331 (1960) (Berkowitz, m.). If the
employer has an unrestricted right to discharge under the agreement, those clauses of
the contract dealing with job security and the adjustment of grievances would be
rendered meaningless. The company could layoff, recall, transfer and promote in viola-
tion- of seniority provisions merely by using its unlimited power of discharge. It is
reasonable to assume that this could not have been the parties' intention, and, accord-
ingly, a just cause provision may be implied. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1949), in
Cox & Bom, CASES ON LABOR LAW 527 (6th ed. 1965).
22. Worthington Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. 1, 6-7 (1955) (McGoldrick, J.).
23. Platt, Arbitral Standards in Discipline Cases, in THE LAW AND LABOR-MANAcE-
Emmr R LATiONS 223, 234 (Univ. of Mich. 1950).
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Proper industrial discipline is corrective rather than punitive. The
purpose is to instill self-discipline in the working force. Both the employer
and the employee lose when the employment is terminated. The employer
must recruit and train a replacement, and must often reckon with ill will on
the part of the discharged employee's fellow workers, while the employee
loses his seniority and all valuable rights connected with it. Therefore dis-
charge should normally be invoked only as a last resort, after it has become
clear that corrective measures will not succeed.24
This rationale runs throughout grievance arbitration, but nowhere
is it more clearly manifested than when the arbitrator is called upon
to construe the technical requirements for discharge under the con-
tract.
B. Technical Requirements
Typically, the collective bargaining agreement will contain a dis-
ciplinary procedure, which will provide for a system of oral and
written warnings and reprimands. It may also set out a system of
progressive punishment; and, in cases where management believes
discharge is warranted, provision may be made for notification of the
bargaining representative or the grievance committee.25 If the parties
fail to include a disciplinary procedure in the contract, some system
for handling discharges usually will become established through
custom and past practice. Whatever the manner in which the dis-
ciplinary procedure is established, however, its requirements must
be strictly complied with. This rule rests upon the assumption that
informal and non-technical handling of labor disputes, while often
desirable, is inappropriate where the discharge of an employee is
concerned.26
1. Warnings.-In determining whether a disputed discharge was
for just cause, it is relevant that the employee has or has not received
a prior warning as to the unsatisfactory nature of his conduct. If
prior warning has been given, this will weigh against the employee, 7
but failure to give such previous warning will often result in the dis-
charge being set aside. 8 Whether or not an absence of warning will
constitute a fatal defect, of course, will depend upon the contract
language and the past practice of the parties. At the very least, how-
ever, such a failure may be one of the reasons for upholding the
grievance. On the other hand, there are a number of offenses for the
commission of which an employee may be summarily discharged.
24. Ross, supra note 16, at 26-27 (footnotes omitted).
25. Thyer Mfg. Corp., 62-2 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8351 (1962) (Williams, R.).
26. Kroger Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1386 (1961) (Barnhart, R.).
27. ELrouRx & ELKouru, How ARBrrmATroN Womxs 431 (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter
cited as ELrKouPR & ELKoUra].
28. See Smith's Tranfer Corp., 62-3 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 9005 (1962) (Seidenberg, J.).
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For the most part, these involve a degree of moral turpitude, such as
theft, assaults on supervisory personnel, and aberrant sexual practices,
among other offenses. The contract, moreover, may specify additional
dischargeable offenses that require no warning as a condition to
discharge.29 Yet, it is apparent that even though an offense con-
stitutes a ground for discharge under the contract, this without more
does not dispense with the warning requirement. 30
Although a warning, or even several, may be given by the em-
ployer, the appropriateness of such warning or warnings may be called
into issue. Again, this relates back to the disciplinary procedure;
that is, the warning must comply with the very letter of the con-
tract. Thus, an employee may not be discharged for violation of
a company rule where the contract requires warning for the offense,
even though the rule may have been adequately promulgated, and
the employees warned that infraction would result in discharge.31
Obviously, then, a form of individual warning is required, as opposed
to the group warning implicit in the promulgation of a rule. In a
similar vein, an oral warning, regardless of its severity, will not suffice
if a written warning is required by the contract.32 It is a further
requirement that the offense which occasions the warning must be
the same or at least closely related to that for which the employee
is finally discharged.33 Accordingly, a mere general warning often
will not be sufficient. However, if the written communication makes
reference to the employee's shortcomings with sufficient particularity,
it will usually be adequate even though it is not framed in typical
warning language.34
Further, the employer is held strictly to the spirit and intent, as
well as the letter, of the contract's warning requirements. Thus, where
29. ibid.
30. Roy Stone Transfer Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 577 (1962) (Strong, G.). In this case,
a truck driver was discharged for tampering with the tachograph mounted on his
truck, an offense made dischargeable by the contract. The policy of the company was
clear and the driver knew of the rule. In rebuttal, the union offered the dischargees
exceptionally good record, contending that the discharge penalty was too severe. The
arbitrator ordered the employee reinstated without back pay, noting that the grievant
had not received warning that his previous good record would not mitigate the severity
of the discipline.
31. Cf. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 39 Lab. Arb. 419 (1962) (Hebert, P.).
32. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 62-1 CCH Lab. Arb. 9 8222 (1961) (McConnell, J.).
33. Consolidated Badger Co-op., 64-1 CCH Lab. Arb. II 8033 (1963) (Gundermann,
N.).
34. Colonial Baking Co., 64-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8015 (1963) (Holly, J.). The griev-
anf-fn this case had been absent in the vicinity of 11% of his scheduled shifts. Prior
to discharging him the company sent him a letter summarizing his past record of ex-
cessive absences. The union argued that this did not constitute a warning, but was
merely for the purpose of calling past warnings to the grievant's attention. The arbi-
trator, however, held that the letter satisfied the contract's written warning requirements
and upheld the discharge.
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a union official was discharged for leaving his post early, the arbitrator
ordered him reinstated because the employer had issued both an oral
and a written warning for only the previous offense.35 Clearly, the
arbitrator will not regard a mere formal compliance as controlling,
if such a construction will in effect allow the employer to bypass a
step of the disciplinary procedure.36
2. Progressive Punishment.-It is not unusual for the contract to
specify warning for the first offense, layoff for the second offense, and
discharge for the third offense, or some other system whereby the
degree of punishment is increased with each transgression. If such a
procedure is provided for in the contract, the arbitrator usually will
not allow the employer to depart from it in the absence of compelling
necessity.3 7 The purpose of a graduated sequence is "to impress upon
the employee on the occasion of each offense in the sequence the
necessity of improving his habits and correcting his faults, thus
giving him one or more additional opportunities and incentives to
become a satisfactory employee."- It is apparent that the inclusion
of a graduated sequence clause in the contract imposes upon manage-
ment an affirmative duty of patience, and the arbitrator will require
the employer to fulfill this duty.
39
3. Notice to Bargaining Representative.-The agreement may well
require that the employer notify the union or the grievance com-
mittee when it has decided to discharge an employee, either before
or just after the discharge. Again, this requirement is construed strictly
by arbitrators in order to protect the integrity of the grievance
procedure. Clearly, the purpose of the grievance procedure is to re-
35. Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 64-1 CCH Lab. Arb. f[ 8082 (1963) (Shister, J.)
(contract required both an oral warning and a written warning as conditions precedent
for discharge; the obvious intention of the parties was that an oral warning would be
issued for the first offense, and a written warning would be issued for the second
offense); Aetna Ball & Roller Bearing Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 417 (1962) (Larkin, J.) (two
,warning notices bore the same date).
36. However, several recent awards indicate the existence of a growing under-
current of contrary authority. By this minority view, substantial compliance with the
procedural requirements of the contract is held to be sufficient so long as the rights of
the dischargee have not been prejudiced and the purpose of the procedural requirements
has been satisfied. See, e.g., Forest City Foundries Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 644 (1965) (Stras-
shofer, R.); Columbus Show Case Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 507 (1965) (Kates, S.).
37. Commercial Steel-Casting Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 286 (1962) (Kates, S.).
38. Id. at 290. See also SHuLmAN & CHAMBERLAIN, CASES ON LABOR RELATIONS 409
(1949).
39. Alexander, Discussion, in MANAGEMENT RIGHTS AND THE ARBITRATION PROCESS 81
(Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators
1956). For two cases in which managements patience simply ran out and the arbi-
trator agreed that rehabilitation had failed, see Potash Co. of America, 40 Lab. Arb.




quire management and the bargaining representative to try to reach
agreement in a timely fashion.40 If news of the discharge is left to
filter back to the bargaining representative via the employee or by
other means, chances are that this purpose will be defeated.4 It is
not uncommon, then, for the arbitrator to order reinstatement when
the representative has not been notified by the appropriate means set
out in the contract.42 Moreover, it is held that actual notice is not
equivalent to written notice, when the latter is required by the con-
tract.43 Should the contract not stipulate that notice must be given
prior to the discharge, this requirement will not be implied,44 and,
generally, the notice will be deemed sufficient so long as it is delivered
within a reasonable time following the discharge.
45
40. Most grievance procedures require that grievances be filed and processed accord-
ing to a timetable. The following procedure, excluding its provisions relating to arbi-
tration, is included by way of illustration:
"[SEoON] 01. Any employee shall have the right, at any time within twenty (20)
days after the incident out of which the grievance arises, to present grievances to the
Company. Any such grievance shall be handled in accordance with the following pro-
cedure:
"First: Between the aggrieved employee accompanied by the shop steward, if the
employee so desires, and the foreman involved. The foreman shall give the employee
and the shop steward, if present, an answer.
"Second: Failing satisfactory adjustment within forty-eight (48) hours, the shop
steward, accompanied by the employee, will take the matter up with the assistant super-
intendent, whose first duty shall be to ascertain whether the matter has been properly
presented through the regular channels, and if not, he shall see that this is done. The
complaint at this point shall be reduced to writing by the shop steward on a printed
form. An answer shall be given in writing by the assistant superintendent within
seventy-two (72) hours.
"Third: Failing satisfactory adjustment, the grievance shall be turned over to the
business representative, who, with the grievance committee of not to exceed three (3)
shop stewards, shall take the grievance up with the plant superintendent, and plant
personnel director.
"Fourth: Failing satisfactory adjustment, the grievance shall be taken up by the
representative of the International Union with the vice president in charge of operations
or his designated representative.
"Fifth: Failing satisfactory adjustment, the grievance shall be referred to a Board of
Arbitration .... " 1964 CCH LAB oR LAw CounsE ff 2596.01.
41. See Heavy Minerals Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 962 (1959) (Williams, R.). Under
grievance procedures requiring that grievances be filed within a certain number of days
from the date of the discharge, see note 40 supra, a failure to comply with the time
limitations set forth therein will result in the dischargee losing his right to process a
grievance. See Continental Baking Co., 62-3 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8857 (1962) (Duff, C.);
H. Reznikoff & Sons, 62-2 CCH Lab. Arb. 11 8468 (1962) (McPherson, W.). Accord-
ingly, it is of the utmost importance that the union be informed of the discharge
promptly in order to enable it to start processing a grievance.
42. Accord, Deere & Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 787 (1961) (Davis, P.).
43. Great Bay Chem. & Plastics, Inc., 62-3 CCH Lab. Arb. f. 8999 (1962) (Kerrison,
D.); American Lava Corp., 61-3 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8708 (1961) (King, G.). Contra,
Forest City Foundries Co., supra note 36.
44. Kroger Co., supra note 26.
45. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 64-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8217 (1963) (Wren,
H.).
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C. Management at Fault
It is axiomatic that management may not impose the supreme
penalty if it is in any way responsible for the employee's faulty
conduct. Management may be held partially to blame when its criteria
for imposing discipline are confused and unknown to employees; when
it overlooks rule violations, or permits a course of misconduct to
continue without taking prompt action calculated to halt such mis-
conduct; or when it neglects to instruct employees in the proper
performance of their duties. It may also be at fault if it fails to enforce
rules or assess discipline in a consistent and uniform manner. Should
it be shown that management was partially at fault, the employee's
transgression must be of a particularly serious nature in order for the
discharge to be upheld.
1. Clearly Defined Position.-In addition to being reasonable and
understandable, plant rules must be promulgated and employees
informed of the consequences of their breach.46 Moreover, if the em-
ployer fails to make its position reasonably clear in regard to conduct
it considers objectionable, the discharge penalty imposed for such
conduct may well be set aside. In Tower Iron Works,47 for example,
the arbitrator refused to sustain a discharge for absenteeism because
the company failed to support its position by means of a system of
understood administrative procedures. That is to say, its position on
absenteeism was unclear.
2. Leniency and Overpermissiveness.-The employer may nullify a
plant rule by continually overlooking its breach on the part of the
work force, for employees may not be subjected to severe penalties
"when the violation is known to members of supervision and is
tolerated and condoned."48 It, of course, makes no difference that
46. Indiana Gas & Water Co., 63-1 GCH Lab. Arb. 11 8025 (1962) (Willingham, J.);
Lockheed Aircraft Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 829 (1957) (Hepburn, W.). Further, plant rules
must be enforced in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner. See notes 65-85 infra
and accompanying text.
47. 62-2 CCH Lab. Arb. If 8663 (1961) (Teele, J.); cf. Gateway Prod. Co., 61-3
CCH Lab. Arb. If 8639 (1961) (Marshall, P.); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 29 Lab.
Arb. 528 (1957) (Horlacher, J.).
48. Misco Precision Casting Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 87, 90 (1962) (Dworkin, H.). In
the Misco award, the arbitrator set aside the grievant's disciplinary suspension for card
playing on company time in violation of a plant rule because their foreman had known
of it and was not adverse "to taking a hand" on occasion. If higher management had
not known of the rule violation and had suspended the supervisor as well, the question
would be whether the foreman's knowledge could be imputed to his superiors. Quite
possibly, the foreman's superiors would be likewise charged with knowledge. It is
true that the employees could hardly help but be aware that the foreman was violating
the rule; but it is likewise true that the foreman is entrusted with securing compliance
with company rules and regulations at that level, and by his action lulled the grievants
into assuming that their transgressions would go unpunished. Seemingly, this situation
could be likened to those where the employer has "entrapped" the employee. On the
entrapment defense generally, see text accompanying notes 139-42 infra.
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the employer's condonation was reluctant;49 the important factor is
whether it took affirmative steps to require observance of the rule10
In the absence of such affirmative action, the employer is required to
make known his intention to enforce the rules as a condition to apply-
ing disciplinary sanctions for their breach.51
This problem may arise in a similar context when management has
tolerated an employee's idiosyncrasies over a long period of time,
or when it has failed to impose sanctions calculated to improve the
employee's attitude and performance. Thus, where an employee,
generally known as a "character," was discharged for insubordination,
the arbitration board ordered him reinstated without back pay upon
learning that he had been behaving in a like manner for some twenty
years. It reasoned that "some new variation of a theme which has run
through years of employment should not precipitate anything so
violent as total discharge."52 In Greer Limestone Co.,5 the arbitrator
ordered an employee discharged for absenteeism reinstated. Although
the dischargee had received five warning notices and had been told
that he would be discharged for the next unexcused absence, he
subsequently accumulated twelve unexcused absences for which he
was not disciplined. The reinstatement was based on the ground that,
"not to discipline nor to warn in a manner different from past warn-
ings would reasonably lead the person warned to believe that the
warnings were not seriously intended."M Therefore, it would seem
that a discharge will not be sustained when management has led an
employee to assume that his future transgressions will go unpunished
as they have in the past.
55
49. Albert Scaletti, Inc., 61-1 CCH Lab. Arb. g 8070 (1960) (Kerrison, L.).
50. Cf. Soule Steel Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 765 (1963) (Roberts, T.).
51. Misco Precision Casting Co., supra note 48.
52. Armour Agricultural Chem. Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 289, 291 (1963) (Logan, C.).
53. 40 Lab. Arb. 343 (1963) (Lugar, M.).
54. Id. at 349.
55. It is, however, most difficult to distinguish this situation from the case in which
management has been excessively patient to a point where it becomes apparent that
the employee will never "mend his ways." Potash Co. of America, supra note 39,
involved an employee who was discharged for leaving his post early. He had received
numerous oral warnings and three written warnings, the last oral warning having been
delivered the day before the discharge. In spite of this, the arbitrator held that the
employer was not estopped from discharging him, that "one more chance" would be of
no avail.
Obviously management was at fault in both cases for not imposing a disciplinary
layoff when it first became apparent that the repeated warnings were having no effect
for at least two reasons. First, it may be that if the grievants had been convinced at
an early date that management was in earnest, they might have developed into
reasonably satisfactory employees. Secondly, by neglecting to take further action beyond
warning, higher management undermines the authority of foremen and supervisors who
are placed in the position of delivering repeated warnings which come to mean littlo
or nothing to the work force. The result in Greer at least makes certain that management
will not repeat its mistake. The arbitrator in Potash, by expressly rejecting the idea
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3. Inadequate Instruction and Supervision.-This problem usually
arises after an employee has been discharged for negligence or
inefficiency. To support its contention that discharge is an unduly
severe penalty, the bargaining representative may offer the fact that
the employer was at fault for not having instructed the employee
in the performance of his job,56 or that he had been inadequately
supervised.57 If it appears that the employee was in fact inadequately
trained or supervised, the arbitrator will usually mitigate the discharge
penalty at least. This general proposition is well illustrated by the
award in Lockheed Aircraft Co.58 In this case, the grievant had been
transferred to the classification of final inspector over his objections, a
position for which he was poorly suited by temperment and experi-
ence. He was given no formal instruction but was left to "learn the
ropes" from the other inspectors. He subsequently was discharged for
inefficiency, and there was no doubt that his performance had been
seriously deficient. Noting his fine work record before having been
transferred, the arbitrator ordered him reinstated with back pay and
full seniority to a comparable but not necessarily identical job
classification. If it appears that a grievant's performance is markedly
inferior to that of other employees, however, and they likewise have
not had the benefit of proper instruction, his discharge may be
sustained.
5 9
4. Fault of the Immediate Supervisor.-In instances where the
grievant's misconduct is in some way attributable to ,the fault of his
immediate supervisor, the arbitrator will usually mitigate tre dis-
charge penalty and order the grievant reinstated without back pay or
with partial retroactivity where appropriate. The problem usually
arises when the grievant is discharged for insubordination and the
foreman has either provoked or initiated the exchange. If such is the
case, the employee's act of insubordination must be of a particularly
serious nature in relation to the provocation in order for the discharge
penalty to be upheld.60 In addition, the awards indicate that the im-
mediate supervisor is charged with a duty of tact6' and perhaps even
that the failure to impose a disciplinary layoff raises an estoppel against the company,
merely perpetuated an undesirable situation. See also Times Publishing Co., 63-2
CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8531 (1963) (Dworkin, H.).
56. Kxoger Co., 61-2 CCH Lab. Arb. I[ 8366 (1961) (Giles, J.).
57. Cf. United States Borax & Chem. Corp., 62-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8077 (1961)
(Guild, L.) (issuance of warning notice held improper when employee sought super-
visor's help and his request was initially denied).
58. 26 Lab. Arb. 682 (1956) (Hawley, L.).
59. March Elec. Co., 61-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8238 (1961) (Seinsheimer, W.).
60. See National Castings Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 442 (1963) (Walter, P.) (supervisor
hurled racial epithet; grievant hurled 7 lb. casting-discharge upheld).
61. See Lone Star Heat Treat Corp., 62-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8080 (1961) (Williams,
J.) (employee persisted talking to .sqpervisor about some damaged dies for which he had
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understanding. To illustrate, Tungsten Mining Corp.62 involved a miner
who refused to perform a work assignment without assistance, although
past practice had established that he was not entitled to a helper
for this particular job. He was discharged upon his further adamant
refusal. The arbitrator ordered him reinstated, noting that the man's
actions indicated his fear of the work assignment, and that the super-
visor should have inquired into his reasons for wanting a helper
before discharging him. Finally, there have been cases in which the
grievant's reinstatement was based upon the fact that the foreman
had not properly identified himself. 63 Obviously, in this situation the
alleged insubordinate act lacks the requisite element of wilfulness.6
5. Discrimination and Unfairness.-It is clear that in imposing the
penalty of discharge, whether for infraction of plant rules or other
misconduct, management must not unfairly discriminate among em-
ployees. 65 Basic fairness requires that employees engaging in similar
misconduct be penalized equally in the absence of circumstances
justifying unequal treatment.66 Thus, the term "discrimination" con-
notes an unfair distinction in treatment, 7 and the prohibition against
discrimination requires merely "like treatment in like circumstances." 68
The discrimination issue may arise in a variety of factual situations.
It may be that less than all employees guilty of the same misconduct
are discharged,6 9 or an employee may be discharged for a particular
offense for which no other employee had ever been discharged, 0
or finally two employees may be discharged for engaging in similar
misconduct but one is less culpable than the other.71 Since a rea-
sonable variation in punishment is permissible, the discriminatory
been responsible despite latter's admonition to stop talking; held, improperly dis-
charged); Colson Corp., 61-3 CCH Lab. Arb. f[ 8814 (1961) (Sabella, A.) (female
employee discharged for refusing to prepare a report on orders of her foreman; arbitrator
set aside discharge, finding that employee was upset by foreman's practice of con-
tinually asking her for dates-she apparently got into the habit of saying "no").
62. 22 Lab. Arb. 570 (1954) (Maggs, D.).
63. See, e.g., General Tel. Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 499 (1965) (Roberts, T.); Libby-
Owens-Ford Glass Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 493 (1965) (Sembower, J.).
64. See text accompanying notes 227 & 228 infra.
65. Pittsburgh Standard Conduit Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 807 (1959) (McCoy, W.).
66. Erouna & Erxouni 431-32.
67. Alan Wood Steel Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 843, 849 (1954) (Short, J.).
68. Ibid.
69. Texas Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 413 (1958) (Owen, J.).
70. United States Steel Corp., 63-1 CCH Lab Arb. ff 8181 (1963) (Garrett, S.).
In this context, however, the question will turn on the past practice of the parties.
For thorough discussions of this topic, see Erxomun & ELraoum 266-83; Mittenthal,
Past Practice and the Administration of Collective Bargaining Agreements, in AiirnA-
ION AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 30-58 (Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of tho
National Academy of Arbitrators 1961).
71. Cf. Bethlehem Steel Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 686 (1962) (Voltin, R.); Gimbel Bros,
61-3 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8899 (1961) (DiLeone, P.).
[ VOL, 20
NOTES
discharge case most often will involve a determination of whether
one or more of a host of mitigating or aggravating factors will serve
to justify the disparity in treatment.
A reasonable distinction in treatment may be supported on the basis
of a corresponding distinction in culpability, 2 the work records of the
respective employees,'73 a distinction in the nature of the involved
employees' jobs,74 and the employer's lack of knowledge that the
non-discriminated-against employee had engaged in such miscon-
duct." In addition, the bargaining representative's claim of dis-
crimination based on past practice sometimes may be refuted by a
clearly defined company policy whereby each case is individually
considered on its merits.76 Yet, when an employee is discharged for an
offense and the company historically has been lenient in dealing with
employees guilty of this same offense, the union's case is extremely
strong. In these circumstances, it is possible that the arbitrator may
regard the company's failure to notify the union of the change in
policy as grounds for setting aside the discharge,'77 at least in the
absence of special circumstances. 78 Furthermore, it has been held
72. Detroit Steel Joist Co., 65-1 CCH Lab. Arb. 11 8181 (1965) (Mittenthal, R.).
In this case, four employees were discovered drinking on the job. The grievants, who
were plainly drunk and abusive, were discharged, while the remaining two employees,
who returned to their assigned tasks quietly and completed them without difficulty, were
not. On these facts the arbitrator denied the grievance, stating that the union's charge
of discrimination had not been substantiated. See also United States Steel Corp., 63-1
CCH Lab. Arb. 11 8005 (1962) (Altrock, D.) (discipline of two members of crew
who volubly refused a work order upheld, although other members of crew who
remained silent were not disciplined); Gimbel Bros., supra note 71 (four week suspen-
sions of five employees who merely joined another in sharing a bottle brought into plant
by latter reduced to one-week suspensions on the ground that drinking on the job is not
as serious an offense as bringing liquor into plant).
73. Consolidated Badger Co-op., supra note 33 (dischargee had received prior
warning, while other employee who had committed same offense had not); Alan Wood
Steel Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 843 (1954) (Short, J.).
74. Cf. Southwest Potash Corp., 63-1 CCH Lab. Arb. 19 8293 (1963) (Abernethy,
B.). This case involved a miner who was suspended for refusing a direct order to.
return to work. The suspension was challenged on several grounds, including an
allegation of discrimination. The latter allegation was based on the fact that other
employees who had not returned to the job immediately were not suspended. The
arbitrator found the distinction in treatment justified because the nature of the em-
ployee's job was such that work could not proceed until he had returned.
75. Detroit Steel Joist Co., supra note 72.
76. Celotex Corp., 63-1 CCII Lab. Arb. 1 8302 (1963) (Larkin, J.).
77. Perth Amboy Evening News Co., 63-2 CCH Lab Arb. 11 87D3 (1963) (Schmertz,
E.). See also United States Steel Corp., supra note 70.
78. See White Pine Copper Co., 63-2 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8548 (1963) (Larkin, J.)
(intoxicated employee discharged when he became abusive in spite of long history of
leniency for reporting drunk); Pasadena City Lines, Inc., 62-3 CCH Lab. Arb. 11 9055
(1962) (Roberts, T.) (company policy of offering drivers a chance to resign where
proof of misconduct would require additional investigation unavailable to dischargee
because no additional proof was needed in his case). See also American Hoist &
Derrick Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 1 (1960) (Bradley, G.).
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that the discrimination issue may not be raised when the favorably
treated employee is a foreman or supervisor, although the latter may
be guilty of the same offense.19 This result was supported by the
following hypothesis: "[T]he Union has no contractual or other basis
for questioning the Employer's relations with its supervisors or for
demanding that disciplinary action shall be meted out uniformly and
in precisely the same manner as between members of supervision and
employees represented by the Union."80
On the other hand, arbitrators as a rule have not considered the
favorably treated employee's greater seniority as a factor in and of
itself significant enough to warrant a great distinction in treatment.8'
Practically, this seems wise since the older employee has a greater
familiarity with plant rules and the disciplinary practices of the
employer.82 Yet, greater seniority apparently has not been considered
an aggravating factor justifying a greater degree of punishment. In
addition, there is no clear agreement among arbitrators whether the
employer may single out an employee for special punishment because
he is a union representative or some other kind of employee leader,
merely because of his status as such.
83
In the final analysis, then, the discrimination issue resolves itself
into a rather simple question of degree. Given that the favorably
treated employee would have been discharged but for the existence
of one or more of the above factors, the mitigating circumstances
must serve to justify the degree of disparity between discharge and
the punishment actually accorded. To illustrate, in Welman Bronze
79. Eberhard Foods, Inc., 31 Lab. Arb. 675 (1958) (Smith, R.). Contra, Great
Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 823 (1962) (Turkus, B.).
80. Eberhard Foods, Inc., supra note 79, at 679. The facts of this case are interest-
ing and worth noting. The grievant, a union officer, believed that a certain supervisor
had discriminated against him in the application of company rules and had solicited
employees to withdraw from the bargaining unit. His resentment led him to accost
his supervisor after working hours in a non-company owned parking lot. The principals
fought and there was ample evidence that the grievant initiated the fight. Later the
same evening the supervisor came upon the employee looking under the former's car,
and assuming that he was up to no good, unceremoniously kicked him in the head,
got into his car and left. Holding that the fight was work related, the arbitrator upheld
the discharge. He refused to regard the company's failure to discharge the supervisor as
evidence of discrimination for the reason already stated. At first glance this may
appear to be a poor award, but it is a general rule that management must be allowed
to select and control supervisors without interference from the bargaining representative
as an incident to its right to control plant operations. ELKOURI & Erxour 370. In
most instances a demand by the union for the discharge of a supervisor is not even
arbitrable. Ibid., citing Electro Metallurgical Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 8 (1952) (McCoy,
W.). It is apparent that the union was on shaky ground in asserting this argument.
81. Moraine Mfg. Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 1161 (1963) (Warns, C.); Great At. & Pac. Tea
Co., supra note 79.
82. Ibid.
83. See American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 61-3 CCH Lab. Arb. 1 8897
(1961) (McCoy, C.).
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& Aluminum Co.,'8 the grievant left his work area early and was
finally found by his foreman in the locker room along with six other
employees who had similarly left their areas early. The grievant was
discharged on the basis of this offense and his poor work record,
while the other six employees merely received warning notices. The
arbitrator refused to uphold the discharge on the ground that, even
considering the grievant's poor record, such a disparity in punishment
amounted to discrimination. 5 In this factual situation, had the re-
maining six employees been suspended, it is possible that the dis-
charge would have been upheld. If so, it would have been because
the arbitrator was convinced that the grievant's record warranted the
degree of disparity between discharge and suspension.
D. Double Jeopardy
The legal concept of double jeopardy, so deeply engrained in our
system of justice, has become a firmly established principle of in-
dustrial discipline. To punish a man, or even expose him to punish-
ment, more than once for the same offense not only is repugnant to
the concept of just cause,86 but it serves to "diminish confidence in
arbitration as a process for obtaining justice."87 Accordingly, it is
held that "once discipline . . . has been imposed [by the em-
ployer]8 and accepted, it cannot thereafter be increased."8 9
Difficulty in applying this principle has centered around the ques-
tion of whether the employee, in fact, has been punished or exposed
to punishment prior to the discharge. Some arbitrators have held that
"the rule presupposes that something in the nature of a formal charge
and hearing and final disposition of the merits has been held,"90 but
more often the test is whether a matter, once closed, is being reopened
to the employee's detriment.9 Of course, both the employee and
management must consider the matter closed with the initial determi-
nation of whether or not to impose discipline in order to bring the
doctrine into play,92 and establishing this fact admits of some difficulty.
84. 39 Lab. Arb. 212 (1962) (Miller, D.).
85. See also Todd Shipyards Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 333 (1961) (Williams, J.).
86. Durham Hosiery Mills, 24 Lab. Arb. 356 (1955) (Livengood, C.).
87. International Harvester Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 616 (1951) (McCoy, W.).
88. It is well established that unless the initial discipline is imposed by the employer,
the doctrine of double jeopardy will not apply. Thus, where an employee is tried and
convicted for a work-connected offense, the doctrine of double jeopardy does not
prevent his subsequent discharge. Cf. ELouRi & Euxounr 427-28.
89. Durham Hosiery Mills, supra note 86, at 358.
90. Diamond Gardner Corp., 32 Lab. Arb. 581, 586 (1959) (Smith, R.) (discipline);
International Harvester Co., 13 Lab. Arb. 610 (1949) (Wirtz, W.); Erxoru &
Eu~ouru 427.
91. Hi-Life Packing Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 1083 (1963) (Sembower, J.); Olin Mathieson




It would appear that if this initial determination is made by a super-
visor having the power to discharge, and the employee is led to
believe that this determination is final, the initial decision should be
binding upon management.9 3 Certainly, it is unfair to lead the em-
ployee to believe that the matter is foreclosed and then impose the
discharge penalty as an afterthought. In this connection, it should
make no difference that further reflection convinces the supervisor that
the original action taken was too lenient,94 or that subsequent events
show the offense to be more serious than it first appeared.95
Since management is held to any decision which purports to be
final, it is important that it acts only after ascertaining all relevant
facts and determining the magnitude of the offense. If it is made
clear that the action taken in the first instance is temporary, pend-
ing further investigation or consideration by higher officials, double
jeopardy will not constitute a defense to a subsequent discharge. 6
For example, the use of a suspension for a definite period, or even an
indefinite suspension which is terminated within a reasonable time
by either discharge or a revocation of the suspension upon investi-
gation "is . . . not a denial of due process or . . . [an] imposition of
double jeopardy."-
It is often said that an employee may not be discharged on the
basis of his record alone.98 That is to say, there must be a disciplinary
event to precipitate the discharge, although this offense need not be
such that would, by itself, require the discharge penalty.9 The rea-
soning behind this rule lies in the double jeopardy doctrine. To
93. Ibid. The Hi-Life award involved an employee who reported to work under the
influence or so his foreman thought. The employee denied that he was drunk and the
foreman finally sent him home after telling him that he would be reported sick. Instead,
the incident was brought to the attention of higher management and the employee was
discharged. The arbitrator, in ordering reinstatement, held that the doctrine of double
jeopardy was applicable. In the Olin Mathieson award, an employee was found
sleeping on the job by his foreman, an especially serious offense in that particular
plant. The foreman mentioned that he had caught the grievant in a pretty bad position
and admonished him not to repeat the offense. He reported the incident to his relief
foreman who, in turn, informed his superiors. The employee was discharged and the
arbitrator, after noting that the double jeopardy doctrine was inapplicable, upheld
the discharge. These awards may be reconciled by the fact that in Hi-Life the
foreman had the power to discharge the grievant on the spot while the foreman in
Olin did not. It is apparent that in the latter case the foreman could not have con-
sidered the matter closed with his admonition because he realized that he did not
have sufficient authority to discipline such a serious offense. In addition, he did not
lead the grievant into believing that the warning would be the only discipline imposed.
If he had, it is possible that this would have brought the doctrine into play.
94. Durham Hosiery Mills, supra note 86.
95. Ibid.
96. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 293 (1960) (Schmidt, M.).
97. Vulcan Corp., 37 Lab. Arb. 1112, 1115 (1961) (Emerson, F.).
98. Metropolitan Transit Authority, 39 Lab. Arb. 855 (undated) (Fallon, W.).
99. United States Steel Corp., 40 Lab. Arb. 205 (1963) (Florey, P.).
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discharge on the basis of past offenses alone, in effect, would reverse
the prior action taken and amount to double jeopardy. 00 It is estab-
lished, however, that an employee's prior record may be considered
in determining the propriety of the penalty assessed for a later
offense.' 0'
E. Procedural Due Process
"Due process," by which an employee is protected against the
arbitrary action of his employer, is an essential element of the arbitra-
tion process. Much of what has already been said and much of what
is to follow involves this concept; but here it will suffice to examine
some of the particular problems connected with the requirements of
notice and hearing which assure the employee of his "day in court."
Additionally, it would seem appropriate to mention some of the special
problems which may arise from the nature of collective bargaining
itself, a process often described as not overly concerned with the
rights of the individual.
1. Contractual Due Process.-It has been noted that arbitrators
tend to construe the procedural requirements for discharge strictly.
The notice and hearing requirements in no way constitute exceptions
to this rule. The vast majority of contracts will provide that the
dischargee must be formally notified of the action taken and the
reasons therefor. Further, he invariably will be entitled to some form
of hearing in which facts surrounding the incident will be examined
in detail. The requirement of notice necessitates little discussion. In
general, it may be said that if the notice is delivered in a timely
fashion in accordance with the contract, and is such as to inform the
employee of his discharge and the reasons for the company's action
with sufficient particularity, this requirement will be held to have been
satisfied.102 Obviously, the notice requirement is designed to inform
the employee of the charges pending against him in order to enable
him to file a grievance. The requirement of a hearing, however, merits
more explanation.
The contract may provide for a review prior to the imposition of
the discharge penalty, 1' 3 or the discharge may precede the hearing
which is then held following the employee's resort to the grievance
procedure.' 4 If the contract does not provide for a full investigation
by the grievance committee and management prior to the dis-
100. Metropolitan Transit Authority, supra note 98.
101. Coast Pro-Seal Mfg. Co., 63-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8361 (1962) (Komaroff, M.).
102. See Babcock & Wilcox Co., 41 Lab. Arb. 862 (1963) (Dworkin, H.).
103. Decor Corp., 44 Lab. Arb. 389 (1965) (Kates, S.).




charge, the employee is often protected from arbitrary discharge by
the fairly common requirement that a union representative be present
when the penalty is imposed. 105 The inclusion of such provisions in
the contract, however, prohibits summary dismissals and may not be
dispensed with in the absence of compelling circumstances. 10 For the
most part, arbitrators regard such requirements as elements of con-
tractual "due process" without which a discharge must be held
"premature and wrongful."107
Often, a form of prior review will become established through past
practice, and on this basis arbitrators tend to require an affirmative
duty of investigation prior to imposing the discharge penalty. This
fact is well illustrated by United States Steel Corp.,108 wrich in-
volved two truck drivers who allegedly had swindled their employer's
lessor. The lessor, after assuring the employees that the matter did
not concern their employer, secured confessions from them which,
in turn, led to their conviction for larceny. They agreed to make
restitution and were given suspended sentences. Upon learning of
their convictions their employer discharged them summarily. The
arbitrator, noting that it was the company's practice to call in em-
ployees and acquaint them with the reasons for the action taken, set
aside the discharge, stating:
The Company took the unsupported word of an adversely interested party
(the Lessor) with no attempt whatever to weigh the fair risk or false
confessions having been elicited by the Lessor's assurance, although this
could readily have been done by interviewing the aggrieved employees. 109
It must be noted that where the right of an employee to be heard
prior to the imposition of the discharge penalty is not created by the
contract or established by past practice, there is some disagreement as
to whether the employer retains the power of summary dismissal. One
view is that an employer retains this right so long as the dischargee
is informed of the charges pending against him and is afforded a
105. See, e.g., Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. 1020 (1963)
(Wren, H.); Heavy Minerals Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 962 (1959) (Williams, R.).
106. Decor Corp., supra note 103.
107. Id. at 391. "The review requirement is important because, among other things,
it tends to diminish the likelihood of impulsive and arbitrary decisions by supervisors
and permits tempers to cool and deliberate judgment to prevail; it encourages careful
investigation of the facts by both the Company and the Union; it provides an oppor-
tunity whereby the accused may be heard; it permits the presentation, sifting and
weighing of all relevant factors; it provides an opportunity to measure the proposed
penalty against the alleged offense in the light of the grievant's history, the past
treatment by the employer of similar offenses, and other relevant circumstances; it
permits consideration of apologies, regrets, and other mitigating circumstances; and
encourages the parties to consider rehabilitation possibilities." Ibid.
108. 29 Lab. Arb. 272 (1957) (Babb, H.).
109. Id. at 277-78. .See also National Carbide Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 128 (1956)
(Warns, C.); ELKOuRi & Erxoum 424-25.
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hearing within a reasonable time." 0 The contrary, and perhaps more
prevalent, view is that an investigation must be made before manage-
ment makes its decision to discharge, for there will have been a
"hardening of positions" by the time the grievant is afforded an
opportunity to be heard through the grievance procedure."' Perhaps
these views are not as irreconcilable as they may seem, for the second
appears to envision an informal investigation along the lines suggested
in the United States Steel award," 2 while it is doubtful that under
the first an employer may summarily dismiss without at least making
an attempt to discover whether the employee, in fact, committed the
offense charged." 3
Regardless of whether the dischargee is afforded a hearing before
or after the imposition of the discharge penalty, the aggrieved em-
ployee has a right "to a fair and impartial determination of his
alleged culpability. . . .""14 If the conduct of the hearing indicates
that this right is in any way impaired, the arbitrator may regard this
as a ground for setting aside the discharge. Thus, where a company
official acting as a hearing officer refused to allow the grievant to
present evidence on his behalf freely, the arbitrator ordered him
reinstated, ruling that his right to an impartial hearing had been
"irreparably prejudiced."" 5
2. Due Process in the Arbitral Forum.-The due process considera-
tions mentioned above have dealt with fairness in the grievance proce-
dure, but the question may be asked: "What of fairness in the
arbitral hearing itself?". At this juncture the interests of the dischargee
and the parties to the collective bargaining agreement may at times
diverge, raising as a further problem the extent to which the arbitrator
should protect individual rights. Behind this pregnant question lies
a veritable myriad of fascinating problems. 16 Among those most
110. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra note 104; Trans World Airlines, Inc., 61-2
CCH Lab. Arb. 11 8407 (1961) (Smith, L.).
111. See West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 515 (1965) (Daugherty,
C.); Grief Bros. Cooperage Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 555 (1964) (Daugherty, C.).
112. Supra note 108.
113. See Philco Corp., 45 Lab. Arb. 437 (1965) (Keeler, V.) (employer's investi-
gation so shallow and worthless that it failed to meet due process requirements).
114. Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 38 Lab. Arb. 641, 642 (1962) (Seidenberg, J.).
115. Ibid.
116. The subject of due process and individual rights in the arbitral forum has been
exhaustively commented upon by a number of writers. See, e.g., HAYS, LABOR
AnBrrnAmoN: A DIssENr'Nc ViEw 105-13 (1966); Barbash, Due Process and In-
dividual Rights in Arbitration, in N.Y.U. 17TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 7
(Christensen ed. 1964); Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REV.
601 (1956); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151 (1957);
Fleming, Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, in ARBrrRATION AND
PUBLIC POLICY 69 (Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the National
Academy of Arbitrators 1961); Hanslowe, Individual Rights in Collective Labor Rela-
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pertinent to this discussion are notice, participation by the dischargee
in the arbitral hearing, right to counsel, the agreed or informed award,
and confrontation. These are all the more important in view of the
drastic nature of the discharge penalty and the relatively recent
interest in individual rights shown by the courts.'
By and large, the awards indicate that arbitrators attempt to effect
a balance between the sometimes competing interests of the dis-
chargee on the one hand and those of the union and the employer on
the other. Their efforts include:
(1) a willingness to permit individuals to be heard in arbitration hearings
if they ask to be heard, and even some willingness to listen to counsel for
the individuals; (2) an uneasiness about (and frequently a rejection of)
"rigged arbitrations'; and (3) a stated concern about notice .... 118
If, however, the arbitration hearing is seriously tainted by unfairness,
as, for example, where the propriety of a discharge is determined
without affording the dischargee notice or an opportunity to be heard,
the award may be collaterally attacked either before the National
Labor Relations Board or in the courts. For over a decade, the
Board has ignored arbitration awards determining the propriety of
discriminatory discharges within the meaning of section 8(a) (3) 11
of the NLRA, if they fail to meet a certain minimal standard of fair-
ness.uo In 1962, the Board broadened its influence in this general
tions, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 25 (1959); Lenhoff, The Effect of Labor Arbitration Clauses on
the Individual, 9 ARB. J. (n.s.) 3 (1954); McRee, The Adversely Affected Employee
and the Grievance and Arbitration Process, in SYmPosan u ON LABOR RE.LA-rONs LAW
431 (Slovenko ed. 1961); Silver, Rights of Individual Employees in the Arbitral
Process, in N.Y.U. 12T- ANruAL CONFERENCE ON LAB oR 53 (Stein ed. 1959);
Stockman, Discussion of Due Process of Arbitration, in THE ARBITRATOR AND THE PAnRIES
37 (Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the National Academy of
Arbitrators 1958); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements-A Preliminary
Analysis, in N.Y.U. 12TH ANNuAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 63 (Stein ed. 1959);
Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv.
362 (1962); Williams, Intervention: Rights and Policies, in LABOR A3rrnA TioN AND
INDusTRAL CHAN(E 266 (Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the National
Academy of Arbitrators 1963); Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in THE AnnImATon
AND ThE PARTIs 1 (Proceedings of the Eleventh Meeting of the National Academy of
Arbitrators 1959).
117. See, e.g., Local 770, Retail Clerks v. Thriftimart, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 421, 380
P.2d 652 (1963); Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825 (1963);
Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 962 (1960).
118. Barbash, supra note 116, at 13.
119. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
120. Since 1955 the Board has indicated its willingness to give 'hospitable acceptance
to the arbitral process' as part of the collective-bargaining machinery, by voluntarily
withholding its undoubted authority to adjudicate alleged unfair labor practice charges
involving the same subject matter," 28 NLRB ANN. REP. 38, 39 (1964), if the arbitral
proceeding meets certain minimal standards of fairness. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B.
1080 (1955). The Spielberg criteria governing the Board's recognition of arbitration
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area, indicating that it will assert jurisdiction when the individual
grievant has been subjected to "unfair . . . or invidious treatment"
at the hands of his bargaining representative, and declaring this
"breach of the duty of fair representation" an independent unfair
labor practice- 2'
Moreover, the courts have recognized that an employee alleging
a breach of the duty of fair representation states a cause of action
against the bargaining agent under the National Labor Relations
Act.' 22 And this breach "may be imputed to the employer as an
unfair labor practice if the breach is related to union membership,
loyalty, the acknowledgement of union authority or the performance
of union obligations, in violation of section 8. . ."23 In Humphrey v.
Moore,'2 4 the Supreme Court, in addition to holding that an individual
may maintain an action based on the breach of the duty of fair
representation under section 301 of the LMRA, seemingly intimated
that arbitration awards may be upset if affected individuals are not
given notice or an opportunity to be heard.25 Quite possibly, then,
awards, as expanded and delineated by subsequent cases, is basically as follows: "(1)
The arbitration proceeding must have been fair and regular, i.e., (a) notice must have
been given the parties, and (b) representation must have been adequate. (2) The
alleged unfair labor practice issue must have been fully litigated. (3) All parties must
have agreed to be bound by the award. And (4) the award must not be repugnant
to the Act." ABA, SECTION OF LABOR RELATiONS LAW, REPORT OF TE DEVELoPMIENT
OF LAw UNDEa =a NLRA 118 (1965). The Board is constantly re-evaluating its
position in this area. See Virginia-Carolina Freight Lines, 155 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (1965);
Aetna Bearing Co., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (1965); Modem Motor Express, Inc., 149
N.L.R.B. 1507 (1964); Aerodex, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964); Thor Power Tool Co.,
148 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1964); The Coachman's Inn, 147 N.L.R.B. 278 (1964); Roadway
Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513 (1963); Valley Transit Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 658 (1963);
Dubo Mfg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 431 (1963); Precision Fittings, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. 1034
(1963); Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883 (1963), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 471
(ist Cir. 1964); Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1416 (1961); General
Motors Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 413 (1961); Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097
(1961); J. Oscherwitz & Sons, 130 N.L.R.B. 1078 (1961); Ford Motor Co., 131
N.L.R.B. 1462 (1961); Hershey Chocolate Corp., 129 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1960); Univer-
sity Overland Express, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 82 (1960); Honolulu Star Bulletin, Ltd., 126
N.L.R.B. 1012 (1960). See also McCulloch, Arbitration and/or the NLRB, 18 Ann.
J. (n.s.) 3 (1963).
121. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963), 18 VAND. L. REv. 268 (1964); Note, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1081
(1965).
122. Syres v. Local 23, Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) per curiam; Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953).
123. 17 VMW. L. REv. 1328, 1331 (1964).
124. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
125. Id. at 350. At least one commentator has thought it extremely significant that
"the court went beyond the basis for the union's decision to consider whether the
. . . employees were 'deprived of a fair hearing by having inadequate representation
at the hearing'. . . . and . . . apparently used . . . some 'trial-type hearing standards'
in conducting its inquiry." Barbash, supra note 116, at 21.
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a dischargee who finds himself the victim of a collusive arbitration
award, or whose discharge has been deemed for proper cause without
his being allowed to appear and be heard, may find a measure of
relief beyond the arbitral forum. Therefore, if the parties wish the
arbitration award to represent the final disposition of the dischargee's
rights under the agreement, it would seem that certain basic standards
of fairness must be observed in the hearing.126
III. EviDENCE
The facts establishing the alleged dischargeable offense are most
often proved by testimonial evidence. Testimony is given in an
informal atmosphere and adherence to the technical rules of evidence
is not usually required. Arbitrators, however, have recognized the
essential validity of the reasons underlying the rules of evidence and,
where appropriate, have adopted them for use in the arbitral forum.
Accordingly, though the evidentiary rules have been greatly simplified
and their use is characterized more by flexibility than by consistency,
their essence has been retained.
A. Free Admissibility
The parties are given wide latitude in presenting evidence tending
to strengthen or clarify their position, and such proffered evidence is
for the most part freely received.'27 It may be said that, as a general
proposition, nearly any evidence which adds to the arbitrator's
insight into the total situation will be accepted.'- 8 There are several
reasons for this liberal attitude, but the most important involves the
function of the arbitration process. The grievance procedure, of
which arbitration is merely the final step, is designed to facilitate the
settlement of disputes to insure the smooth functioning of the indus-
trial community. If the arbitration award provokes further discord,
the purpose for which the grievance procedure was established will be
defeated.129 Thus, the arbitrator must take into consideration the
entire bargaining relation of the parties in order to render a viable
award, and his knowledge of the total situation may well be enhanced
by seemingly irrelevant matter. In the discharge context, for example,
the arbitrator must consider, among other things, "the employee's
126. See HAys, op. cit. supra note 116, at 105, predicting with obvious enthusiasm
that unless arbitrators are more receptive to the requirements of procedural due
process, the courts will be forced to take an increasingly greater interest in arbitration
proceedings.
127. Erxoum & EKoumr 174.
128. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 Hanv. L. Ruv.
999 (1955).
129. Aaron, Some Procedural Problems in Arbitration, 10 VAND. L. REv. 733, 744
(1957).
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past record, his length of service, or the possibility of severe economic
forfeiture resulting from discharge, on the one hand, or the effect
of his reinstatement on the morale of supervisors and fellow employees
...on the other."'
30
Several other factors are usually advanced in support of the broad
admissibility policy. First, quite often either one or both parties
will not be represented by counsel. Needless to say, the unrepre-
sented party would be considerably hampered in the presentation of
his position were it not for the free admissibility policy.131 Moreover,
some arbitrators apparently feel that "the grievance process serves
psychological ends quite apart from the righting of specific wrongs
and that these objectives may be thwarted if the parties are not al-
lowed to speak their piece in full."1' Lastly, the severity of the
discharge penalty demands that all relevant facts be brought forward
for the arbitrator's consideration.
Of course, the arbitrator may properly refuse to admit evidence in
his discretion if it appears that the proceedings will be drawn too far
afield. With this exception, most arbitrators will agree with the follow-
ing words of Dean Shulman:
Ideally, the arbitrator should be informed as fully as possible about the
dispute he is asked to resolve. He should hear all the contentions with
respect to it either party desires to make.
The more serious danger is not that the arbitrator will hear too much
irrelevancy, but rather that he will not hear enough of the relevant.133
B. Protection of the Dischargee by Analogy to Criminal Procedure
1. "Search and Seizure.-The awards dealing with the admissibility
of evidence obtained from an improper search of an employee's
private effects are too few and inconclusive to support any broad
principle. It will suffice to say that on occasion evidence has been
rejected on this ground when the search was such as to offend the
basic notion of fairness that underlies due process. In Campbell Soup
Co.,134 for example, an employee was discharged for violation of a
plant rule prohibiting the possession of dangerous knives on the
premises. A plant guard had discovered the violation through a
unilateral search of the employee's locker. The arbitrator, in uphold-
ing the grievance, stated: "Knowledge, even though incriminating if
acquired through such illegitimate procedures, is of questionable
130. Id. at 741.
131. See Seitz, Problems Faced by Arbitrators in the Process of Judging, in SYM-
POSIUM ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW 413 (Slovenko ed. 1961).
132. Cox & Box, CASES ON LABOR LAw 519 (6th ed. 1965).
133. Shulman, supra note 128, at 1017.
134. 2 Lab. Arb. 27 (1946) (Lohman, J.).
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validity in bringing action against the individual." 135 A fairly recent
award, Congoleum-Nairn, Inc.,"36 also supported the right of em-
ployees to be free of improper searches and seizures, although on
somewhat different facts. Municipal police officers seized lottery slips
from the grievant's locker, but this evidence was rejected on con-
stitutional grounds at his trial. The employer subsequently discharged
the grievant for gambling and sought to justify its disciplinary action
by introduction of the lottery slips. In rejecting this proffer of
evidence, the arbitrator stated: "the constitutional protection against
unlawful search and seizure is of little value if evidence ordered
suppressed may be recaptured by public authorities and used against
an accused in a collateral proceeding... ."137 On the whole, rowever,
arbitrators probably will not reject evidence obtained through a private
search of an employee's effects. In this connection, the right of the
employer to inspect the briefcases and lunchboxes of employees as
they leave their place of work is generally upheld when not pro-
hibited by past practice."3
2. "Entrapment.--This problem rarely arises in its familiar context;
that is, where the employer devises a plan by which an employee is led
to commit a wrongful act which he otherwise would not have com-
mitted. In this situation, it is apparent that the arbitrator would
refuse to uphold the discharge.139 More often, the doctrine is called
into issue when an employer utilizes surveillance techniques to halt
pilferage, gambling, violation of company rules, or other wrongful
activity. Evidence obtained in this fashion is usually credited by
arbitrators, and discharges based thereon are quite generally upheld.
For example, in Sun Drug Co., 40 a warehouseman's superiors grad-
ually came to suspect him of gambling on the company's premises and
secreted a listening device in the warehouse telephone booth in order
to gather evidence against him. He was discharged after he was
heard telephoning bets. The arbitrator, in sustaining the discharge,
brushed aside the union's defense of entrapment. It is apparent that
an entrapment defense could not be sustained in these circumstances,
for the employer did not in any way induce the dischargee to commit
the offense. Objections to surveillance of this type would more
properly appear to violate the grievant's right of privacy, a problem
which, while sometimes dealt with on the lower steps of the grievance
135. Id. at 31.
136. 63-2 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8843 (1963) (Short, J.).
137. Id. at 5727.
138. See, e.g., Friedrich Refrigerators, Inc., 63-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8108 (1962)
(Williams, J.).
139. Cf. Borg-Warner Corp., 3 Lab. Arb. 423 (1944) (Gilden, H.).
140. 31 Lab. Arb. 191 (1958) (Marcus, J.).
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procedure, is rarely taken to arbitration.141 It is also generally con-
sidered that the company may employ the services of unidentified
checkers or spotters, and evidence obtained by them is admissible to
support the company's imposition of discipline. 14
3. "Privilege Against Self-Incrimination."-To a certain extent there
is a concensus among arbitrators that this privilege, as such, has no
place in the arbitration of discipline cases.1 43 It is nonetheless true
that, in a proceeding to determine the propriety of a discharge, arbitra-
tors have no power to compel the grievant to take the stand and
testify as to his alleged acts of misconduct.'4 To say there is no
privilege against self-incrimination, then, means merely that the griev-
ant's refusal to testify is subject to certain inferences. These go not to
ultimate guilt or innocence, however, but rather are inferences of
certain evidentiary facts which, in turn, serve to establish guilt or
innocence.
45
The effect of this inference upon the union's case is better under-
stood in relation to allocation of the burden of proof. It is generally
held that the company has the burden of establishing a prima facie
case which the union must rebut. The failure of an available grievant
to testify is taken into consideration in assessing the weight to be
given to the defense's evidence and determining whether it suffices
to rebut this prima facie case.14 In this manner, the inference is
used to obviate any advantage which the grievant might initially
gain by not testifying. 47
There are two principal reasons why arbitrators fail to recognize
the privilege against self-incrimination. The first lies in the distinction
between the arbitral and the judicial processes; that is, "the typical
disciplinary case is 'a matter not to be viewed primarily as a question
of penalty for misconduct, but as a problem of whether or not, all
things considered, the individual has proved an unsatisfactory em-
ployee."14 Secondly, the inference encourages the grievant to testify,
thereby bringing additional facts to the arbitrator's attention which,
in turn, results in a more informed award.
There are indications, however, that in some instances this inference
should be given little weight. For example, if the grievant's failure to
testify is simply because his personality is such that he would make
141. See Wirtz, supra note 116, at 17.
142. See, e.g., Pasadena City Lines, Inc., 62-3 CCH Lab. Arb. fr 9055 (1962)
(Roberts, T.). See also notes 205-12 infra and accompanying text.
143. Wirtz, supra note 116, at 19.
144. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 270 (1955) (McCoy, W.).
145. Ibid.
146. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 26 Lab. Arb. 742 (1956) (McCoy, W.).
147. McConmicK, EVIDENCE § 132 (1954).
148. Wirtz, supra note 116, at 19 (quoting Arbitrator James Hill).
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a poor witness, attaching any importance to the inference would be
manifestly unfair. 49 Furthermore, when the employee is discharged
for alleged offenses involving moral turpitude, use of the inference
runs contrary to the belief that the arbitrator should require the same
exacting standards that prevail in a criminal proceeding. 50
4. "Confessions."-Coerced confessions are subject to the same de-
fects and criticisms whether they are used to support the imposition of
the discharge penalty, or to prove the commission of a public crime.
Since the use of inducements, commitments or threats to obtain a
confession is regarded as being patently unfair, the arbitrator may be
expected to rule confessions inadmissible when any one or more of
these coercive elements appear.151 Consequently, a confession is ad-
missible only when given by the grievant of his own free will. 52
C. Proof
1. "Burden of Proof."-The allocation of the burden of proof is
stressed far more in the arbitration of discharge cases than in other
types of industrial disputes owing, no doubt, to the serious nature of
the penalty imposed. The manner of allocating the burden of proof is
quite similar to that used by a court. The burden of proving wrong-
doing is generally held to rest upon the employer throughout the
proceeding.153 The burden of first proceeding also rests upon the
employer, but the making of a prima facie case by the employer will
discharge this burden and cast upon the union the burden of going
forward to rebut the prima facie case.' It is clear that if the
employer fails to establish its case, it will not have discharged its
burden and the union is not required to put on any proof in order
to prevail 55 Further, this defect may not be cured by the inference
arising from the grievant's failure to testify.
156
Not unexpectedly, the burden of introducing and proving affirma-
tive defenses rests upon the union. 57 For example, the union may be
expected to advance evidence of circumstances to justify the em-
ployee's conduct, or to mitigate the seriousness of the offense; and it
has the burden of proving, by a reasonable degree of proof, that the
149. Id. at 19 n.9.
150. See Aaron, supra note 129.
151. United States Steel Corp., supra note 108.
152. Kroger Co., 12 Lab. Arb. 1065 (1949) (Blair, J.); ELiKounx & ELKOUnI1
194-95.
153. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 146.
154. Ibid.
155. Publishers' Ass'n, 65-1 CCH Lab. Arb. U 8014 (1964) (Altieri, J.).
156. Ibid.
157. See ELKouRi & ELKOI 417 n.34 and the authorities cited therein.
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discharge penalty was unwarranted because of these circumstances. 1
In order to sustain a defense of discrimination, however, the union is
required to show by a very high degree of proof that the more
favorably treated employees were guilty of the same offense, that
management knew of their transgressions, and that "[it] had sufficient
evidence to establish their guilt."159
2. "Quantum of Proof."-The degree of proof which must be
adduced by the employer is subject to some disagreement among
arbitrators. Those who subscribe unequivocally to the view that dis-
charge constitutes "economic capital punishment" most likely will
require "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" in all discharge cases.160
Other arbitrators recognize that such a high standard of proof is often
impossible to satisfy. They recognize as well that, particularly in
periods of full employment, discharge is not in any sense economic
capital punishment, since "by the time the grievance reaches arbitra-
tion the grievant may be happily employed somewhere else."161 Ac-
cordingly, a majority of arbitrators tend to require a somewhat milder
degree of proof such as "preponderance of the evidence" 62 or "clear
and convincing evidence." 163 This latter approach appears preferable
in view of the nature of the dispute being arbitrated. Clearly, a stan-
dard of proof which the employer is rarely, if ever, able to satisfy im-
pedes rather than encourages the collective bargaining relationship.
Little imagination is needed to see that cooperation with the bargain-
ing representative will be difficult for an employer whose right to
enforce shop discipline is sharply curtailed.
Yet, there is an overwhelming concensus that the arbitrator is
justified, even required, to observe the stringent, "reasonable doubt"
standard in a hearing to determine the propriety of a discharge for
alleged acts of moral turpitude.164 Quite simply, "[the] protection of
158. See, e.g., Minneapolis-Moline Co., 61-2"CCH Lab. Arb. 8305 (1961) (Flagler,
J.).
159. Detroit Steel Joist Co., 65-1 CCH Lab. Arb. f[ 8181, at 3655 (1965) (Mittenthal,
R.).
160. Aaron, supra note 129.
161. Id. at 740. See also Cannon Elec. Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 879 (1957) (Jones, E.),
where it was pointed out that "competitive labor conditions . . . [will] redress the
injustice of a mistaken or unjust discharge" only where there is a "shortage of the
particular skills possessed by the discharged employee .. " Arbitrator Jones concluded
"where the local labor situation means an employee is not readily employable elsewhere
... a vigorous standard... [of proof] seems applicable." Id. at 883.
162. See, e.g., Ormet Corp., 63-2 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8453 (1963) (McDermott, T.).
163. See Cannon Elec. Co., supra note 161.
164. See, e.g., Geo. H. Dentler & Sons, 42 Lab. Arb. 954 (1964) (Boles, W.);
Ames Harris Neville Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 803 (1964) (Koven, A.); Congoleum-Nairn,
Inc., supra note 136; McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 63-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8306 (1963)
(Sembower, J.). But see Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 62-3 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8955 (1962)
(Ryder, M.), where it was held that in cases involving discharge for acts which carry
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an innocent employee against the injustice of industrial blackballing
and social ostracism demands the most careful and exacting scrutiny
to assure that the facts alleged as the basis of the discharge actually
exist."'6 Implicit in this, of course, is the idea that a finding of just
cause in such a case condemns a dischargee just as surely as would a
criminal conviction. It is recognized "that the employer will at times
be required, for want of sufficient proof, to withhold or rescind dis-
ciplinary action which in fact is fully deserved .... 166 "[T]his kind of
result," however, "is inherent in any civilized system of justice."6 '
In spite of numerous statements to the effect that the employer
must prove just cause by a "preponderance of the evidence," or beyond
a "reasonable doubt," there are indications that arbitrators "will not
evaluate the evidence solely on the basis of rigid standards of proof."" 8
The nature of the industrial offense is such that frequently the most an
arbitrator can do is determine whether or not the discharge penalty
was warranted under the circumstances. In reaching this decision,
the arbitrator is influenced by considerations wholly apart from the
evidence adduced in the particular case, such as the employee's record,
his seniority, and the bargaining history of the parties, all of which
may be expected to color his view of the evidence. Consequently, in
any two cases the quantum of proof required for just cause may
well vary according to these collateral considerations. Consider, for
example, the following admonition to two employees whose discharges
were reduced to disciplinary layoffs:
Your Arbitrator's experience is that in cases where severe disciplinary lay-offs
have been previously imposed, or where once before the grievant was
'saved by the bell' that the quantum of proof required by succeeding
arbitrators for just cause seems in reverse ratio to the prior history, i.e.,
the more the history, the less the proof to measure just cause.169
D. Surprise
1. Admissibility of New Evidence.-Evidence proferred for the first
time in a hearing to determine the propriety of the discharge may or
may not be ruled admissible depending upon the character of the
evidence and the circumstances under which it is presented. Generally
speaking, "the validity of the discharge should be tested by the
evidence considered and acted upon by the Company official who
connotations of illegality, the standard of proof is high, but falls below that required
in criminal proceedings.
165. Cannon Corp., supra note 161, at 883.
166. Kroger Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 906, 908 (1955) (Smith, R.), quoted in ELoumI &
ErLoumi 418.
167. ibid.
168. Aaron, supra note 129, at 741.
169. Loblaw, Inc., 62-2 CCH Lab. Arb. f 8431, at 4596 (1962) (Reid, B.).
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made the decision to discharge." 70 This general rule would exclude
evidence discovered after the discharge has occurred,' 7 ' as well as
consideration of post-discharge acts of the grievant. 72 Yet, both of
these propositions must be qualified to some extent.
There appears to be no reason why after-acquired evidence dis-
covered by the employer in the course of its investigation should not
be admissible if the bargaining representative is advised of its exist-
ence at the earliest opportunity, and it is introduced at the lower
steps of the grievance procedure. 7 3 Some arbitrators will go further
and admit such evidence provided that it is directed to the funda-
mental issues, 74 and no "deliberate attempt to mislead the other party
is disclosed." 75 In this situation, surprise is generally avoided by
granting the party a continuance during which to prepare a de-
fense. 76 Of course, if the union has also produced supplementary
evidence, there is little question but that the arbitrator will base his
award upon all material evidence. 77
In support of the more liberal rule, it has been pointed out that the
grievance procedure is informal and matters are often dealt with
superficially. 78  Further, management may not have "made the
thorough investigation it will properly consider warranted if the
union ultimately decides to take the case seriously enough to go to
arbitration."7 9 These arguments, although strongly advanced, do not
seem applicable in the discharge context. If, in fact, management has
a duty to investigate and ascertain all relevant facts before the penalty
is imposed, as numerous arbitrators have held,80 it does not seem
unfair to restrict the admission of evidence to that which was
uncovered during the investigation. Moreover, the more liberal rule
'would seem derogative of the hearing prior to, or shortly following,
the grievant's discharge, which is provided for in virtually every
collective bargaining agreement. It will be remembered that this
hearing is designed to permit "the presentation, sifting and weighing of
170. Kennecott Copper Corp., 62-1 CCH Lab. Arb. U 8277, at 4043 (1962)
(Wyckoff, H.).
171. Erxoura & ELKOUmI 425.
172. Abilene Flour Mills Co., 61-1 CCH Lab. Arb. II 8049 (1960) (Granoff, A.).
173. Cf. Lyon, Inc., 24 Lab. Arb. 353 (1955) (Alexander, G.),
174. Kennecott Copper Corp., supra note 170.
175. Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in Tim ARBUrrATOR AND TE PARTMS 1,
15 (Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators
1958).
176. Id. at 16.
177. Kennecott Copper Corp., supra note 170.
178. Wirtz, supra note 175, at 15 (quoting Arbitrator Ralph Seward).
179. Id. at 15.
180. See text accompanying notes 103-13 supra.
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all relevant factors."' 8 ' If this hearing is to fulfill its assigned role as
a discovery device, the burden of thorough investigation and presenta-
tion should be thrust upon the parties at this early stage while the
facts surrounding the incident in question are fresh in the minds of
the principals and witnesses.'82
As a rule, post-discharge acts are not deemed relevant in deter-
mining the propriety of a discharge, and may not be advanced to
support the case of either party.18 Considering that an employee
who has been informed of his discharge may react in a somewhat
intemperate manner, and is in no way subject to plant discipline, this
rule is well founded in fairness. On the other hand, however, his
subsequent acts may bear such a relation to the conduct of the
employer's business that such acts may be considered in relation to the
penalty imposed in lieu of discharge. 18 Further, where the grievant
has threatened objectionable conduct, the arbitrator may consider the
fact that he has carried out his threat as evidence that the employer's
fears were well founded. This is particularly relevant when the threat
was one of the factors leading to discharge. 185
2. Change of Theory.-This problem arises when the employer
asserts at the arbitration hearing a basis for the grievant's discharge
different from that relied upon at the time of the discharge. The
policy considerations applicable here are similar to those noted
above-fairness, the arbitrator's need to know all relevant facts, and
protection of the integrity of the grievance procedure. 186 Accordingly,
the awards show a similar disparity in balancing these considerations.
That a change in theory may not be considered, even in the pre-
arbitral hearing, has been strongly put: "[W]hen a procedure . .
is established, the charge must fit exactly the so-called 'crime.' If
181. See note 107 supra.
182. It takes anywhere from 3 to 12 months to process a discharge case. Teele,
But No Back Pay Is Awarded, 19 AnB. J. (n.s.) 103 (1964).
183. See Aro, Inc., 61-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8006 (1960) (Carson, R.). In this award,
the grievant had been discharged for engaging in a work stoppage. After his grievance
had reached the third step of the grievance procedure one month following the
discharge, other employees committed the same offense under similar circumstances but
were not discharged. On this basis, the union argued that the grievant had been
discriminated against, but the arbitrator refused to consider this as bearing on the
propriety of the discharge. But see Record Pressing, Inc., 64-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8057
(1963) (Miller, E.), where the arbitrator held that a post-discharge attack on a
foreman compounded his previous offense of creating a disturbance.
184. Columbus Show Case Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 507 (1965) (Kates, S.) (vituperative
language directed toward supervisory personnel in the presence of others following
discharge).
185. V. E. Anderson Mfg. Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 174 (1964) (King, G.) (union' officer
continually intimidated members of supervision by threatening to take the employees
"out"; he led a walkout following his discharge).
186. See ELKOURi & ELxOurr 178.
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charges are to be changed willy nilly, then defenses never meet them,
and issues are not presented nor rights protected."187 It seems clear
that if the employer stands on one ground as the basis for the dis-
charge throughout the grievance procedure, it should not be allowed
to fall back on another. 1' However, when evidence supporting a
second ground is discovered, and communicated to the bargaining
agent immediately, there would appear to be less reason why it should
not be considered. 89 In any event, the arbitrator may well hold that
the facts proven by the employer, although falling short of showing
a dischargeable offense, serve to establish a related offense and, on this
basis, refuse to award back pay.
190
E. Grievant's Prior History
In addition to the facts surrounding the alleged disciplinary event,
the grievant's past record is a factor of considerable importance in
determining whether his discharge is for proper cause. 19' Not only
may it serve to mitigate the seriousness of the disciplinary event, but,
as indicated above, it may establish a pattern of "unworkmanlike
performance," which will compound the seriousness of an offense and
often justify discharge.192 "In order to be fair and equitable ... [the]
totality of . . [the] employee's record, good or bad, must be
weighed."19 3 Yet, management may not support its action by means of
warnings or disciplinary notations that have not been communicated to
the employee at the time they were issued; and it makes no difference
that such records were made known to the union before the arbitration
hearing.'9 This rule rests upon the consideration that fairness requires
187. Bendix-Westinghouse Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 466, 470 (1959) (Sembower, J.).
188. Sealtest Dairy Prod. Co., 35 Lab. Arb. 205 (1960) (Morvant, R.); Lyon, Inc.,
supra note 173.
189. Ibid. If the change in theory is considered during the grievance procedure, or
early enough that the parties have the chance to resolve the matter through negotia-
tion, the principal argument against admissibility is answered. See Fleming, Due
Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration in ARrnnR noN AND PuBLc PoLIcy
69, 79 (Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the National Academy of
Arbitrators 1961).
190. See, e.g., Mack Trucks, Inc., 64-1 CCH Lab. Arb. II 8274 (1963) (McCoy, W.)
(evidence insufficient to show that employee had been sleeping on job, but it did show
that he had left his post without authorization; discharge mitigated to one month
suspension without back pay).
191. Rogers v. Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 315 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1963) (objections
to consideration of record deemed frivolous).
192. Lone Star Cement Corp., 39 Lab. Arb. 652 (1962) (Oppenheim, L.); Phillips
Chem. Co., 61-1 CCH Lab. Arb. II 8181 (1961) (Horton, C.).
193. Harshaw Chem. Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 23 (1958) (Belkin, L.).
194. The Borden Co., 62-3 CCH Lab. Arb. II 8812 (1962) (Boles, W.). "It is
generally deemed not proper for an employer to accumulate a record against an em-
ployee over a period of time without notice to him, and while he is permitted to work
as usual, and then spring the accumulated record as a ground for discharge." Id. at
5952, quoting SHULMAN & CHAMBE.AIN, CASES ON LABOR RELATIONS 439 (1949).
See also Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 605 (1961) (Johnston, C.).
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that the employee should have the opportunity to contest the repri-
mand at the time of issuance and should not be required "to disprove
stale grievances." 195 Although the preferable practice is to issue writ-
ten reprimands and warnings, a record of oral warnings may be con-
sidered if the employee is specifically told that the reprimands are
being entered on records and these are left open for inspection.10
Moreover, the prior offenses must have occurred within a reasonable
time of the discharge in order to be of value in determining its
propriety. 97 In this connection, some agreements provide that warn-
ings and reprimands expire after a certain period of time; hence,
these may not be considered by the arbitrator in framing his award.9 8
There is some disagreement whether the record of a previous offense
is admissible as "evidence on the factual issue of whether a similar
offense has again been committed." 99 Perhaps most arbitrators will
not regard such records of probative value in establishing guilt, but
some express misgiving as to the utility of this rule.200 It is difficult
to reach any conclusion other than that caution obviously should be
exercised in using similar acts as probative evidence of guilt.201
F. Confrontation
1. "Right of Cross-Examination."-The courts regard cross-examina-
tion as an absolute necessity to assure the reliability of evidence.202
Arbitrators also support the right of cross-examination but to a lesser
extent than do the courts. Although the arbitrator may consider
absentee evidence, it is apparent that he will be somewhat prone to
give the dischargee the "benefit of a doubt" when the discharge is
supported in large part by evidence not subjected to the rigors of
cross-examination. 203 Obviously, such evidence is far less convincing
195. ELxoux & ELuoum 429.
196. Purex Corp., 38 Lab. Arb. 313 (1962) (Edelman, M.).
197. ELxoun, & ELxoum 429, citing Borg-Warner Corp., 22 Lab. Arb. 589 (1954)
(Larkin, J.).
198. See, e.g., General Controls Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 432 (1960) (Roberts, T.) (also
holding that record must be admitted at lower steps of grievance procedure); Traben
Engineering Corp., 62-1 CCH Lab. Arb. U 8237 (1962) (Williams, P.).
199. Wirtz, supra note 175, at 20-21.
200. Id. at 21 n.22.
201. See ELnounh & Erxomun 430 n.84 and the authorities cited therein. In Rogers
v. Allied Aviation Serv. Co., supra note 191, the court said: "[Pjast instances of similar
misconduct would seem peculiarly pertinent to assessing the reasonableness of an
employer's discharge of an employee." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) By implication, it
would seem that instances of similar misconduct may not be used as evidence of the
grievanes guilt.
202. McComiicr, EviDENCE § 19, at 41 (1954).
203. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 62-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Uf 8128 (1961) (Levinson,
J.); see Baldwin Piano Co., 62-3 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8931 (1962) (Schmidt, M.).
Contra, Los Angles Transit Lines, 25 Lab. Arb. 740 (1955) (Hildebrand, G.), where
it was stated, "the system may be odious, but there is no practical alternative." Id. at
741.
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and, on this basis, the arbitrator may hold that the advancing party
has not sustained its burden of going forward.204 No hard and fast
rule may be stated, however, for the weight and credibility of absentee
evidence may vary with the circumstances, and, in some instances,
perfect fairness to the dischargee may give way to countervailing
interests.
Two of the more difficult problems involve the reports of secret
investigators and customer complaints. In Twin City Rapid Transit
Co.,205 the arbitrator set aside the discharge of a bus driver who had
allegedly mishandled fares because the company checkers, on whose
report the discharge was based, were unavailable for cross-examina-
tion. He noted that had the checkers been present, it could have
been shown how closely they had observed the driver. In this
situation, it is of crucial concern in evaluating the reports whether
the investigators sat near the driver or toward the rear of the bus,
whether the bus was crowded or not, or whether the driver's actions
were partially obscured by the curtain separating his compartment
from the passengers. It is of equal concern to the employer, however,
that open identification of the checkers would destroy their future
effectiveness .2 6 Seemingly, a proper balancing of these interests
would take into consideration the importance of the checking system
in maintaining discipline and control over the employees,207 the nature
of the alleged offense,20 8 and the degree of doubt naturally arising
from the report itself.20 9 This balancing process, in turn, will deter-
mine the weight to be attributed to the absentee evidence.
What the arbitrator is to do when the discharge is based upon
written customer complaints is an even more difficult question. For
instance, if a customer complains of insolence on the part of the
employee, the arbitrator would wish to know whether the customer
was oversensitive or naturally peevish, and whether the alleged act of
204. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., supra note 203.
205. Ibid.
206. Los Angeles Transit Lines, supra note 203.
207. Ibid. Obviously, if the employer is engaged in the service industry and his
employees characteristically work without direct supervision, e.g., airline stewardesses,
bus drivers, a checking system would be of far greater importance than if the employees
normally work under the direct control of supervisory personnel. In the latter instance,
the employer will normally use investigatory personnel only when plagued by sabotage
or pilferage. The investigators are usually employees of independent contractors
and, thus, there is no harm in requiring their presence at the hearing.
208. Arbitrators have a tendency to discount absentee evidence all but entirely when
it is offered to prove offenses involving moral turpitude. See Aaron, Some Procedural
Problems in Arbitration, 10 VA". L. Rnv. 733, 741 (1957); of. Ames Harris Neville
Co., supra note 164.
209. It is axiomatic that the weight to be given the report must turn in large part on
its completeness and specificity.
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insolence was provoked. On the other hand, the employer often will
be unable to produce the customer at the hearing because of the
danger of prejudicing customer relations, or because the customer is
unable or unwilling to testfy. Under these circumstances some arbitra-
tors will accord considerable weight to the complaint,210 while others
will demand additional corroboration. Perhaps the only conclusion
possible is that "there is simply no way of eliminating the question of
elemental fairness" 212 from these cases, and traditional notions of
fair play will prevail unless the countervailing interests are exceed-
ingly strong.
2. "Hearsay Evidence."-Not a great deal can be expected of a
simple definition of hearsay evidence, but the following definition
proposed by the drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence may be
useful in providing a starting point for a discussion of this important
problem area: "Evidence of a statement . . . [including a written
expression] which is made other than by a witness while testifying at
the hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay
evidence .... ,,213 In a trial at law, of course, such evidence is inadmis-
sible unless it can be brought within one of the various exceptions to
the hearsay rule.214 This stems from a judicial cognizance of the
inherent unreliability of evidence untested by cross-examination. It
does not imply, however, that hearsay evidence is without probative
value. Accordingly, "the characterization of evidence as hearsay is in
reality simply a criticism of the weight that should be given to it."215
For this reason, arbitrators generally admit hearsay evidence "for
what it is worth," determining its weight and credibility in light
of its tainted character and the objections made to its admission.216
Although it is clear that a discharge will not be upheld on the
basis of hearsay evidence alone,217 there are at least four situations
in which the arbitrator will accept and credit hearsay testimony.
First, when the hearsay is capable of being corroborated by other
210. See, e.g., Turnpike Texaco, 62-1 CCH Lab. Arb. f1 8230 (1962) (Stutz, R.).
211. Cf. Niagara Frontier Transit Sys., 32 Lab Arb. 901 (1959) (Thompson, R.).
See also Fleming, supra note 189, at 86.
212. Ibid.
213. UNI oR RULES OF EvrFNcE 63. See also id. 62(1): "'Statement' means
not only an oral or written expression but also nonverbal conduct of a person intended by
him as a substitute for words in expressing the matter stated."
214. McCoa rxcir, op. cit. supra note 202, §§ 223-90.
215. Local 116, United Instrument Workers v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
54 L.R.R.M. 2660, 2661 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
216. Erxovr & Er~xaoua 191, citing Continental Paper Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 727 (1951)
(Lewis, A.).
217. See, e.g., Ames Harris Neville Co., supra note 164; Chardon Rubber Co., 64-1
CCH Lab Arb. 1 8096 (1963) (Hertz, D.); McCord Corp., 64-1 CCH Lab. Arb. 1
8335 (1963) (Witney, F.); Turnpike Texaco, supra note 210 (evidence held direct,
but agreeing that hearsay alone may not support a discharge).
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evidence adduced in the hearing, it obviously is entitled to correspond-
ingly greater consideration. 21  Second, if the adversary has had an
opportunity to interview the absent witness, the principle objection
to hearsay testimony is overcome.219 Third, when the nature of the
hearsay evidence is such that it is inherently believable, it is unlikely
that the arbitrator will discount it because of its hearsay character.220
Fourth, nearly all arbitrators will accept hearsay testimony rather than
require one employee to testify against another member of the
bargaining unit. This is rationalized on the theory that if the testi-
mony is false, the union may offer the testimony of the absent
witness in rebuttal.221
IV. THE FiNmaAC rrTMuON FOR DiSCHARGE
The foregoing has dealt with due process-the means by which
arbitrators attempt to inject fairness into the arbitration process.
For the most part, as we have seen, fairness is achieved by imposing
conditions precedent upon the employer's right of dismissal. These
conditions or requirements, in turn, constitute the guidelines by which
arbitrators determine the propriety or impropriety of a discharge.
Recently, these guidelines were developed into a test composed of
the seven following questions, all of which must be answered in the
affirmative if the discharge in question is to be sustained:
1. Did the company give to the employee forewarning or foreknowledge
of the possible or probable consequences of the employee's conduct?
2. Was the company's rule or managerial order reasonably related to the
orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the company's business?
3. Did the company, before administering discipline to an employee,
make an effort to discover whether the employee did in fact violate or
disobey a rule or order of management?
4. Was the company's investigation conducted fairly and objectively?
5. At the investigation did the 'judge' obtain substantial evidence or
proof that the employee was guilty as charged?
6. Has the company applied its rules, orders, and penalties evenhandedly
and without discrimination to all employees?
7. Was the degree of discipline administered by the company in a
particular case reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the employee's
proven offense and (b) the record of the employee in his service with the
company?222
218. Container Stapling Corp., 63-1 CCH Lab. Arb. 1f 8265 (1963) (Garman, P.).
219. Niagara Frontier Transit Sys., supra note 211.
220. See Aaron, supra note 208, at 744. Needless to say, an arbitrator is far more
likely to credit a memorandum of a conversation made by the personnel director's
predecessor, than a statement allegedly made by the "big shots in the front office." Ibid.
221. Fleming, supra note 189, at 86.
222. Grief Bros. Cooperage Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 555 (1964) (Daugherty, C.). See
also West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 515 (1965) (Daugherty, C.)."
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It is at once apparent that the seventh and final query introduces a
new and broader question which, in essence, asks "Did the punish-
ment fit the crime?" The answer to this question is often the result of
a delicate balancing process in which the detrimental effects upon the
industrial community caused by the offense are realistically appraised
in light of the drastic nature of the discharge penalty. By way of
illustration, the following few paragraphs will consider the industrial
offense of insubordination, emphasizing those factors which will
mitigate or compound the seriousness of the offense.
Insubordination ranks as one of the most serious industrial offenses,
representing a direct attack upon the authority of management to
control the work force and compel adherence to its directives. The
elements of the offense are twofold: first, there must be some overt
act of defiance constituting an open challenge to management's au-
thority, 3 and, secondly, the alleged insubordinate act must be wil-
ful or intentional.224 Arbitrators, therefore, may be expected to set
discharges for insubordination aside when either of these requisite
elements is missing.225 The insubordination issue arises in two related
but separate contexts: specific acts of insubordination, including
refusals to obey managerial directives legitimately related to the
orderly, efficient and safe operation of the company's business, and
refusals to accept work assignments and overtime work. The follow-
ing deals only with specific acts of insubordination, for it is in this
area that the awards best exemplify the balancing process noted
above.
If management is to fulfill its responsibility for maintaining produc-
tion, challenges to its authority to issue reasonable orders and disci-
pline employees for just cause must be sternly met. Otherwise, plant
discipline will be undermined to the detriment of both employer and
employee. It is because of its tendency to have this effect on plant
discipline that insubordination constitutes a dischargeable offense.
In spite of its purported seriousness, however, a relatively recent
survey based on published arbitration awards indicates that of the
71 discipline cases involving insubordination, arbitrators upheld the
penalty assessed by the employer in only 25 instances, while in 29
cases the arbitrators reduced the original penalty.22 The question
becomes why the original penalty is so often set aside. In some cases,
of course, management fails to establish wilfulness as, for example,
where an employee simply neglects to perform a task or to refrain
223. Philco Corp., 45 Lab. Arb. 437 (1965) (Keeler, V.); Steel Scaffolding Co., 45
Lab. Arb. 361 (1965) (Mullin, C.).
224. Hub City Jobbing Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 907 (1964) (Gundermann, N.).
225. Ibid.
226. See Teele, But No' Back Pay Is Awarded, 19 ARB. J. (n.s.) 103, 105 (1964),
citing ELxoum & Ex. ovni 435.
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from doing some act, rather than explicitly refusing to act or refrain
from acting.227 Too, the alleged act of insubordination may be due to
an honest misunderstanding or a failure of communication between
the employee and his supervisor and, thus, lacks this essential ele-
ment.m Moreover, there may be no overt act on the part of the
employee implementing his challenge of authority. For example, if
the employee states that he will not comply with a future order,
there is no insubordination until the order is given and he refuses to
comply therewith.229 Yet, the penalty is reduced in many instances
simply because the arbitrator believes that it fails to bear a reasonable
relation to the seriousness of the proven offense. The basis on which
this conclusion is usually predicated, though sometimes unexpressed,
is that the employee's misconduct, for one reason or another, does
not tend to undermine plant discipline and morale to the point where
necessity dictates his termination. Although plant discipline is the
most important policy consideration, the arbitrator may also consider
the extent to which the offensive behavior tends to affect adversely
the grievance procedure and the bargaining relation of the parties
in general.
In deciding whether a specific act of insubordination merits the
supreme industrial penalty, the circumstances under which the in-
subordinate behavior occurred are often determinative. With only
slight exaggeration, it may be asserted that whether a discharge is
upheld or reduced to a disciplinary layoff sometimes depends less
upon the prima facie impropriety of the employee's conduct than
on such collateral factors as "why," "when," and "where" the mis-
conduct occurred. Obviously, the degree to which the interests of
227. See General Tel. Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 691 (1965) (Prasow, P.); Wilkof Steel &
Supply Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 883 (1962) (Maxwell, M.).
228. Chris-Craft Corp., 45 Lab. Arb. 117 (1965) (Autrey, L.). "Insubordination is
usually thought of as a 'face-to-face' refusal of an employee to perform a task or
restrain from doing some act at the time a supervisor has unequivocally directed the
employee to do such task or to refrain from such act." Id. at 119. See also Hub
City Jobbing Co., supra note 224. In this case, the grievant driver had been told
by his foreman not to leave the motor of his truck running while it was parked in the
company yard. Shortly following this admonition the foreman discovered that the truck
again had been left unattended with its motor running. The grievant subsequently was
discharged for failure to obey a work order. The arbitrator set aside the discharge,
saying the evidence failed to establish that the employee's disobedience was deliberate
rather than negligent.
229. Note, 1949 WAsH. U.L.Q. 154, 157, citing National Lock Co., 4 Lab. Arb. 820
(1946) (Gilden, H.) (worker told that she had to obey orders of certain foreman;
she replied that she might as well quit; discharge set aside-no overt act of insubordina-
tion); Toledo Scale Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 459 (1945) (Lehoczky, P.) (employee ordered to
stop objectionable past practices, order effective the following day; employee refused;




the industrial community are injured at times will depend upon these
collateral factors.
The profanity or abusive language cases furnish perhaps the best
example of insubordinate behavior failing to undermine plant dis-
cipline because of circumstances peculiar to the shop. The realities
of industrial life must surely indicate that the use of profanity in
the shop is not uncommon;230 in fact, it is nearly as often used between
employees and supervisory personnel as it is among employees.231
Accordingly, the fact that strong language is used by an employee in
a dispute with a supervisor cannot, by itself, have any particular effect
on plant discipline.232 "One cannot look nor expect to find that
polished decorum of a cotillion leader"233 in an industrial environment,
and, most often, such language will be categorized as mere "shop-talk."
Conversely, profanity or abusive language used in anger and directed
specifically at a member of supervision cannot be categorized as
"shop-talk."23 Under these circumstances it is clear that the em-
ployee's behavior constitutes "an attack on the right of the Company
to direct the working forces and to require that a member of Super-
vision be treated with common decency and respect for the position
which he holds."z 5 Obviously, such behavior cannot be condoned and,
in most instances, the employee involved will be held to have been
discharged for just cause.
Yet, admittedly insubordinate behavior may not constitute grounds
for discharge if one or more factors tending to ameliorate the offense
are present. In the context of this discussion, perhaps the most
important of these factors is whether the insubordinate behavior was
observed or overheard by other members of the work force.23
6
Flagrant insubordination not only saps the morale of supervisory
personnel, but, more importantly, it tends to undermine managerial
authority in the eyes of production employees. It is reasonable
to assume that this pernicious tendency becomes more pronounced
when the actual confrontation is observed by members of the work
230. See Mayville Metal Prod. Co., 64-1 CCH Lab. Arb. 8351 (1964) (Young,
G.); Cleaners Hangers Co., 63-2 CCH Lab. Arb. U 8626 (1962) (Klein, J.); Fox
Mfg. Co., 62-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8059 (1961) (Williams, R.).
231. See Gaffers & Sattler Corp., 45 Lab. Arb. 65 (1965) (Roberts, T.); Freuhauf
Trailer Co., 62-2 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8437 (1962) (Dali, R.); Cameron Iron Works,
62-1 CCH Lab. Arb. If 8322 (1962) (Giles, J.).
232. Philco Corp., supra note 223; see generally authorities cited notes 230-31 supra.
233. Terminal Cab Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 780, 784 (1947) (Minton, H.).
234. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 948 (1964) (Luskin, B.); Freuhauf
Trailer Co., supra note 231 (discharge set aside because the evidence was in conflict
as to whether the abusive language was directed at foreman).
235. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., supra note 234, at 950.
236. Columbus Show Case Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 507 (1965) (Kates, S.); Paragon
Bridge & Steel Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 864 (1964) (Bradley, G.).
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force, at least as to those employees witnessing the incident.137
Accordingly, the arbitrator may well conclude that plant discipline
has not been endangered to the point where the discharge of the
offending employee becomes mandatory, if the insubordinate behavior
is not observed by other employeesm as, for example, when it occurs
in the relative privacy of a supervisor's office,m or. perhaps on the
graveyard shift when the work force is reduced.2 0  Upon reaching
this conclusion, the arbitrator usually will consider a disciplinary lay-
off sufficient punishment.21
The gravity of the insubordinate behavior also depends on "why"
the misconduct occurred. That is to say, the arbitrator may be
expected to consider all relevant factors surrounding the incident,
including those which caused the employee to act as he did. In some
cases, the incident may have occurred against, a background of
237. ibid.
238. A comparison of two recent awards, both arising out of rather extreme factual
situations, will suffice to illustrate the importance of this factor. In .Paragon Bridge &
Steel Corp., supra note 236, the grievant was discharged for suggesting in obscene terms
that his "foreman perform an act of indignity upon himself" after the foreman fired
a probationary employee with whom the grievant had been working. The arbitrator
upheld the discharge penalty, noting that the exchange took place within earshot of
10 to 20 employees on their way to the wash room following the termination of their
shift. Gaffers & Sattler Corp., supra note 231, involved an employee who became-
engaged in a somewhat overenthusiastic conversation over the plant's ventilation system
with the new plant manager. He subsequently was summoned to the personnel man-
ager's office along with the union president. Not caring for the plant manager's version
of the earlier incident, the grievant twice called him a liar. The plant manager,
noticeably, and perhaps understandably perturbed, snapped "You can't talk to me like
that." To this the grievant replied, "Well you are a big liar." The plant manager
ordered him discharged on the spot, but the arbitrator set aside the discharge on the
ground that it was unduly severe.
Concededly, the employees involved in both of these cases were clearly insubordinate,
but the offense in Paragon is by far the more serious of the two. Consider the adverse
effect a failure to sustain this employee's discharge would have on plant morale,'
efficiency and discipline. His challenge to authority, if unpunished, certainly would
undermine the authority of lower level managerial personnel in the eyes of the 10 to 20
employees who witnessed, and undoubtedly lost no time in relating, the incident.
On the other hand, it would not seem that plant discipline was adversely affected by
the employee's offense in Gaffers. With the exception of the union president, no em-
ployee witnessed the incident, and perhaps the only damage was to the plant manager's
ego. In any event, the latter case illustrates the viability of the following maxim of
industrial discipline: "Discipline should not be upheld solely on the basis that insulting
remarks were made to ... [a member of supervision]. There should be a further
showing that due to the surrounding circumstances, the remarks had an adverse effect
on production or managerial authority." Bucyrus-Erie Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 858, 861
(1965) (McGury, J.).
239. Cf. ibid.




tension,2 2 while in others the offending employee may have believed
that his actions were in the best interests of the company,243 or that
his obedience would entail an unusual risk of personal injury.244
Perhaps the most prevalent motivating factor, however, is the offend-
ing employee's self-interest, or interest in vindicating the rights of his
fellow employees.
No doubt an employee is acting in his own self-interest when he
refuses to obey a work order on the ground that, according to his
interpretation, it is in violation of the agreement. The question, how-
ever, is whether this self-interest is legitimate. The great majority
of arbitrators are of the opinion that this interpretation is not one for
the employee to make; rather, it is a question for the grievance
committee and the collective bargaining process.245 Logically, such
a refusal is insubordinate behavior and constitutes ample cause for
discharge. It is apparent that if the integrity of the grievance proce-
dure is to be protected, the employee must obey the order and then
file a grievance.246 Moreover, the awards indicate that it makes little
difference whether the order is a clear or doubtful violation of the
contract. As Dean Shulman has said: "The only difference between a
'clear' violation and a 'doubtful' one, is that the former makes a clear
grievance and the latter a doubtful one. Both must be handled in the
regular prescribed manner."4 7
242. See Cleaners Hangers Co., supra note 230 (deterioration of labor-management
relations); Hayes Aircraft Corp., 33 Lab. Arb. 847 (1959) (Griffin, J.) (tense atmos-
phere following strike; company hurling rules at union and union hurling grievances
at company).
243. Higgins, Inc., 63-2 CCH Lab. Arb. U 8522 (1963) (Carmichael, P.) (grievant
refused to operate heavy equipment because of risk of damaging equipment on floor-
reinstated without back pay); W. T. LaRose & Assoc., 62-3 CCH Lab. Arb. U 8823
(1962) (Lanoue, E.) (employee made a practice of going to company president with
his complaints).
244. A. M. Castle & Co., 64-1 CCH Lab. Arb. U 8102 (1963) (Sembower, J.)
(suspensions set aside); New York Shipbuilding Corp., 63-1 CCH Lab. Arb. U 8180
(1963) (Crawford, D.) (reinstatement with back pay); Rome Kraft Co., 61-3 CCH
Lab. Arb. Uf 8792 (1961) (Hawley, L.) (reinstatement but no monetary award);
Water Saver Faucet Co., 61-2 CCH Lab. Arb. Uf 8360 (1961) (Sembower, J.)
(reinstatement with back pay). But cf. Marble Prod. Co. v. Local 155, United Stone
Workers, 335 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1964).
245. De Mello's Office Furniture Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 398 (1965) (Koven, A.). See
also Safeway Stores, 45 Lab. Arb. 663 (1965) (McNaughton, W.); Note, supra note
229, at 158.
246. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 61-3 CCH Lab. Arb. U 88-40 (1901)
(Levinson, J.) (recognizing principle but ordering reinstatement without back pay
because of mitigating circumstances).
247. Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. 779, 780-81 (1944) (Shulman, H.). "Some men
apparently think that, when a violation of contract seems clear, the employee may
refuse to obey and thus resort to self-help rather than the grievance procedure. That
is an erroneous point of view. In the first place, what appears to one party to be a
clear violation may not teem so at all to the other party. Neither party can be the
final judge as to whether the contract has been violated. The determination of that
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In the absence of a grievance procedure, however, an aggrieved
employee certainly may approach a member of supervision to voice
his complaint, at least after having complied with the offending work
order.2 48 If, in the ensuing discussion, the employee becomes intem-
perate in his remarks, most arbitrators will be reluctant to find just
cause for discharge unless the employee's actions are inexcusable. 49
Seemingly, the prevailing attitude is that the employee must be al-
lowed considerable latitude in presenting his grievances. Of course, the
employee's conduct in this regard can have little adverse effect on
plant discipline and none whatever on the expeditious processing of
grievances.
There have been numerous cases involving the allegedly insubordi-
nate behavior of shop stewards, committeemen and other union
officials. If "the discharge of a union official is based upon insubordi-
nate conduct in connection with his production activities, the results
should be, and in the main have been, the same as in other cases."250
In fact, some arbitrators have held that because of his greater familiar-
ity with the agreement and the grievance procedures, it is proper to
demand even a higher degree of responsibility on his part.5' There
obviously are limitations to this line of reasoning, for the imposition
of too great a degree of responsibility may amount to discrimination
within the meaning of section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act.?
25
When the union representative is acting in his capacity as such, it is
clear that his conduct must be intolerably insubordinate before the
arbitrator will find that just cause for discharge exists.253 In this
connection, Hunt Foods & Industries2-4 is illustrative of the great
latitude union officials enjoy. Two stewards had spoken to their fore-
man on at least two occasions, bringing it to his attention that they
issue rests in collective negotiation through the grievance procedure. But, in the
second place, and more important, . . . [tihat procedure is prescribed for all grievances,
not merely for doubtful ones. Nothing in the contract even suggests the idea that
only doubtful violations need be processed through the grievance procedure and that
clear violations can be resisted through individual self-help." Ibid.
248. Millage Produce, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 211 (1965) (Miller, E.).
249. Ibid.
250. Note, supra note 229, at 166; see Bethlehem Steel Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 612 (1965)
(Seward, R.); Buick Youngstown Co., 64-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8113 (1963) (Dworkin,
H.); Caterpillar Tractor Co., 63-2 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8654 (1963) (Larkin, J.);
Carling Brewing Co., 63-1 CCH Lab. Arb. 1 8332 (1963) (Dworet, T.).
251. See, e.g., Vickers, Inc., 63-1 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 8270 (1962) (Justin, J.).
252. 49 Stat. 252 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964): "It shall be
an unfair practice for an employer-(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization ... "
253. Bucyrus-Erie Co., supra note 238; Carnation Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 568 (1964)
(Miller, E.); Spartan Printing Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 563 (1963)' (Muiphy,'W.).
254. 44 Lab. Arb. 664 (1965) (Jenkins, J;).
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objected to his performing hourly-rated work. The foreman merely
told them to get on with their own work. The stewards were dis-
charged for situating themselves on either side of the foreman and
shouting obscenities at him, while he subsequently was attempting to
effect a repair on one of the machines, work they also considered
hourly-rated. The arbitrator ordered them reinstated without back
pay, noting that this was a contract dispute and, therefore, the stew-
ards must be granted a greater latitude of speech than when they were
engaged in production.215 The denial of back pay was based not so
much upon their verbal misconduct, but rather on the fact that they
should have allowed the foreman to finish repairing the machine while
reserving their right to file a grievance.
By parity of reasoning, clearly insubordinate conduct in the presen-
tation of grievances, whether informally or at a grievance meeting, will
not constitute grounds for discharge unless the union representative's
actions far exceed the legitimate scope of his official activity.26 The
permissible scope of his official activity, of course, will vary according
to past practice, but, on the whole, arbitrators have been quite liberal
in construing its limitations. It must be remembered that the union
and employer representatives are equals in the collective bargaining
process.257 To compel the union representative to bow to manage-
ment's authority while presenting grievances would restrain him from
vigorously advancing the union's position5 8 Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that "refusal[s] to take orders or involvement in discussion and
disagreement" are not grounds for discipline. Rather, these actions
are "part and parcel of a necessary dialogue in search of a solution
to a controversial issue."219 Even if the union representative is decid-
edly and perhaps unnecessarily disrespectful, the arbitrator will tend
to attribute this to an excess of zeal, although in setting aside the dis-
charge he may well refuse to include back pay in his award.20 In
short, discharge of a union official is proper only when his conduct
so far exceeds the bounds of his legitimate activity that it fairly may
be termed "outrageous." 261 From the foregoing, it is clear that the
255. See also Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 62-3 CCH Lab. Arb. f1 8922 (1962)
(Kadish, S.).
256. Carnation Co., supra note 253; Spartan Printing Co., supra note 253; Wyandotte
Chem. Corp., supra note 255; Ceco Steel Prods. Co., 61-1 CCII Lab. Arb. 8064
(1960) (Daugherty, C.).
257. Dallas Morning News, 45 Lab. Arb. 258 (1965) (Giles, J.); Wyandotte Chem.
Co., supra note 255; International Salt Co., 62-3 CCH Lab. Arb. V 8904 (1962)
(Mittenthal, R.); Note, supra note 229, at 159.
258. Ibid.
259. Dallas Morning News, supra note 257, at 261.
260. Carnation Co., supra note 253; Spartan Printing Co., supra note 253; .Ccco
Steel Prods., supra note 256.
261. See, e.g., Singer-Fidelity Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 746 (1963) (Rock, E.).
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arbitrator must consider the union's legitimate interest in retaining
the right of its representatives to present effectively its position in
addition to management's interest in maintaining plant discipline and
the parties' interest in promoting the expeditious processing of griev-
ances.
Although the above discussion has been limited to a consideration
of insubordination, it indicates that in many instances the cause of
disagreement is not so much whether the grievant's conduct was
wrongful, as it is a question of whether discharge was the proper
penalty under the circumstances. The propriety of the penalty de-
pends upon the seriousness of the grievant's offense which, in turn, is
measured in terms of its harmful effects upon the various interests of
the industrial community. Not only must the arbitrator determine the
extent to which the misconduct injured these interests, but, on oc-
casion, he will be required to balance them as, for example, when a
union representative is charged with insubordination. If the degree
of harm is slight in relation to the severity of the discharge penalty,
or if discharge is inappropriate because of countervailing interests, the
arbitrator will hold that management has abused its authority to dis-
cipline and discharge for just cause. On this basis, he will set aside
the discharge penalty, and order reinstatement without back pay or
with partial retroactivity as the circumstances may require.
V. MODIFICATION OF THE DISCHARGE PENALTY
The above discussion on insubordination indicates that in those in-
stances in which the arbitrator finds that the grievant's offense merits
discipline short of discharge he will feel compelled to modify the dis-
charge penalty assessed by management. This modification usually
takes the form of disciplinary lay-off; that is, reinstatement with partial
or no back pay. In a sense, then, the arbitrator is passing on the
approprlateness of the penalty imposed by the employer. Yet, the
right to assess discipline is clearly vested in management by most
contracts, and the question becomes whether the arbitrator has the
power to rule on the degree of punishment imposed. Some contracts
expressly provide whether the arbitrator has this power,262 but the
262. See, e.g., Agreement between Ford Motor Co. and International Union, UAW
§ 16(b)(3); 1 1965 CCH LAB. L. REP. ff 59,923.056 (effective Nov. 23, 1964):
"Powers of Umpire-(3) He shall have no power to substitute his discretion for the
Company's discretion in cases where the Company is given discretion by this Agreement
or any supplementary agreement, except that where he finds a disciplinary lay-off or
discharge is in violation of the standards set up in this Agreement, he may make
appropriate modifications of the penalty." In 1945, the Chrysler-UAW umpire "was
expressly empowered, 'in proper cases,' to modify penalties assessed by the management
in disciplinary discharges and layoffs.' This authority has been continued in . . .
subsequent agreements. . . . However, the parties have retained a contractual pro-
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majority either leave the question in doubt or make no such provi-
sion.2 3 It will be seen below that if the answer is not found in the
submission, the question is one of contract interpretation.
A. The Arbitral Viewpoint
For the most part, arbitrators have not been overly concerned with
this problem, and the awards are replete with assertions of implied
jurisdiction to reduce the penalty imposed by management. It is said
that unless the language of the contract or submission clearly limits
the arbitrator's power to modify an unfair discharge penalty, the
right to do so is "implied in the arbitrator's power to decide the justice
of the cause ... and in his authority to finally decide and adjust the
dispute before him."26 Not only must the arbitrator be satisfied that
the employee was guilty of the offense charged and that some form
of discipline is warranted, but he must also find that the degree of
punishment imposed, i.e., discharge, was proper under the circum-
stances.25 In other words, "A punishment that fits the crime is equally
a part of 'just cause' and must be proved to the arbitrator's satisfac-
tion."26
It may not be assumed, however, that the arbitrator will modify
the discharge penalty merely because "management has imposed a
somewhat different penalty or a somewhat more severe penalty than
the arbitrator would have, if he had had the decision to make orig-
inally. . . ."26 An arbitrator may properly assess a lighter penalty in
lieu of discharge only when he finds that the penalty imposed was
so excessive under the circumstances as to amount to an abuse of
discretion.26 Unless the employer's action is such that would "shock"
hibition against the chairman's allowing back pay to any employee disciplined for
violating the strikes and lockouts section of the Agreement." Wolff, Crane & Cole, The
Chrysler-UAW Umpire System, in Tim A1BInATOR AND THE PA4nEs 111, 116
(Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators
1958). See also Agreement between Lunkinheimer Co. and Local 1728, United
Steelworkers, quoted in Lunkenheimer Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 580, 581 (1962) (Seinshcimer,
W.): "'Should it be determined by the Umpire that an employee has been suspended
or discharged for cause, the Umpire shall not have jurisdiction to modify the degree
of discipline imposed by the Company."'
263. Platt, The Arbitration Process in the Settlement of Labor Disputes, 31 J. Amf.
JuD. Sody 54, 58 (1947).
264. Platt, Arbitral Standards in Discipline Cases, in THE LA W AND LAUOn MANAGE-
mENT BELATIONs 233, 236 (Univ. of Mich. 1950). See also Vickers, Inc., 33 Lab.
Arb. 594 (1959) (Bothwell, W.); ELxoum & ELxomu 422 n.54 and the authorities
cited therein.
265. Todd Shipyards Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 333 (1961) (Williams, J.); Grief Bros.
Co-op., supra note 222; Vickers, Inc., supra note 264.
266. Justin, Arbitrator's Authority in Disciplinary Cases, 8 Ann. J. (n.s.) 68, 69
(1953).
267. Stockhaam Pipe Fittings Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 160, 162 (1945) (McCoy, W.).
268. Ibid.; Franz Food Prods., 28 Lab. Arb. 543 (1957) (Bothwell, W.); Esso
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the senses of "an ordinary reasonable man," the arbitrator would do
well to avoid interfering with the punishment imposed by a "care-
ful competent management which acts in the full light of all the
facts."2
9
A definite minority of arbitrators subscribe to the view that in no
case is the arbitrator justified in substituting his judgment for that
of management.270 Under this view the absence of an affirmative
grant of authority to modify the penalty imposed indicates that no
such power exists. The arbitrator is called upon to determine only
whether the grievant committed the offense charged and whether
some degree of punishment is warranted.271 Once these questions are
answered in the affirmative, the degree of punishment rests solely
within the discretion of management by virtue of its right to direct
the work force and discipline or discharge for just cause.Y72 In the
event that either question is answered in the negative, of course, the
grievant must be reinstated with back pay and all rights unimpaired.
In actual practice, however, the "either/or" view has largely been
rejected as detrimental to the collective bargaining process. The im-
plied authority to formulate an appropriate remedy is said to "rest
upon the dictates of necessity" to secure the successful functioning of
the industrial institution.273 Accordingly, most arbitrators will not
hesitate to modify a penalty they consider unjust. The following table
represents the disposition of 321 discharge cases and illustrates the
frequency with which arbitrators tend to reduce the discharge penalty.
TABLE I. DISPOSITION OF DISCHARGE CASES274
Disposition Number Percentage
Discharge Upheld 149 46.4
Reinstatement Ordered
(full back pay) 60 18.7
Divided (Generally
without back pay or 112 34.9
with partial back pay)
Totals 321 100.0
Standard Oil Co., 19 Lab. Arb. 495 (1952) (McCoy, W.); Perkins Oil Co., 1 Lab.
Arb. 447 (1946) (McCoy, W.).
269. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 16 Lab. Arb. 666, 670 (1951) (Spaulding, C.). See
also Republic Steel Corp., 23 Lab. Arb. 808, 810 (1955) (Platt, H.); Exouns &
EL~ourx 420-21.
270. See, e.g., Davison Chem. Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 920 (1959) (McGuiness, K.).
271. Consolidated Paper Co., 33 Lab. Arb. 840 (1959) (Kahn, M.); Justin, supra
note 266; Platt, supra note 264.
272. Ibid.
273. Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HAv. L. REv. 1482, 1492 (1959).
274. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ABrrATION Ass'N, PnoCEDUR.AL ASPECTS OF LABoR-
MANAGEMENT ARBrrRATioN, reprinted in 28 Lab. Arb. 933, 946 (1957).
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The modification issue is most often raised in the arbitration of
discharge cases, but this is not to say that arbitrators will not modify
a lesser penalty assessed by management when appropriate. A some-
what more recent survey of 502 discipline cases, including discharge,
is also illustrative of the arbitrators' tendency to review the penalty
assessed by management.





Lesser Penalty Upheld 165 32.9
(as assessed by employer) 74 14.7
Penalty Reduced by 150 29.9
Arbitrator
No Penalty Permitted 113 22.5
Totals 502 100.0
If, in fact, most agreements are silent as to whether the arbitrator
has the power to pass on the appropriateness of the discharge penalty,
the question whether this power may be implied is of obvious im-
portance in light of the frequency with which arbitrators exercise
this power. The authoritative answer to this question, however, must
be given by the courts which enter the picture when called upon to
enforce or vacate an award.
B. The Judicial Response
The attitude of the courts when required to review arbitration
awards modifying the discharge penalty in favor of lesser degrees of
punishment is largely favorable to the arbitration process.2 6 The
275. Euxouns & ELKoUrI 434-41.
276. This discussion assumes that the arbitrator has the power to afford an unjustly
discharged employee full relief (reinstatement with back pay and all rights unimpaired)
even when neither the collective agreement nor the submission makes any specific
provision for the granting of any relief whatever. Prior to 1960, there was con-
siderable controversy as to whether this could be done. See, e.g., Refinery Employees
v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
(1959). Following the Steelworkers Trilogy, however, the courts generally have held
that the arbitrator may award such relief on the ground that there must be an
express prohibition negating the arbitrator's power to fashion a remedy before he
may be denied this authority. Marble Prod. Co. v. Local 155, United Stone Workers,
supra note 244; Lodge No. 12, IAM v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 292 F.2d 112
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961); Electric Specialty Co. v. Local 1069,
IBEW, 222 F. Supp. 314 (D. Conn. 1963); see generally Groske, Arbitration Back-Pay
Awards, 10 LAB. L.J. 18 (1959). Contra, Kansas City Luggage & Novelty Workers v.
Neevel Luggage Mfg. Co., 325 F.2d 992 (8th Cir. 1964).
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proposition that arbitration is to be given a preferred position is now
quite generally accepted, a fact which has led one commentator to
say "that under the leadership of the Supreme Court the courts have
been vying with each other in paying homage to labor arbitration."277
Nevertheless, the courts will examine the contract and stipulation to
determine whether the arbitrator has exceeded the power delegated
to him by the parties. If it does not appear that he had the necessary
power to make the award, it will be set aside.278
An analysis of judicial attitude in this area must of necessity begin
with United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 79 There
the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the enforceability
of an award rendered by an arbitrator sitting after the expiration of
the contract. The award had ordered the reinstatement of unjustly
discharged employees with back pay for all time lost, after deducting
pay for a ten-day suspension and amounts earned in other employ-
ment. The court of appeals, in reversing the district court's judgment
enforcing the award, held that the failure to specify the amounts de-
ducted from the back pay rendered the award unenforceable. While
stating that this defect could be cured by requiring the parties to
complete the arbitration, it further held that both the award of back
pay subsequent to the expiration of the contract, and the order of
reinstatement were unenforceable because the agreement had expired.
The Supreme Court agreed that the district court's judgment should
be modified so that the amounts due the employees might be ascer-
tained by arbitration. The remainder of the judgment, however, was
reversed. The Court noted that the arbitrator's opinion as to the
award of back pay beyond the date of the agreement's expiration and
that of reinstatement was ambiguous, permitting the inference that
he had exceeded the scope of his submission, but stated that "a mere
ambiguity... is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award."' Al-
though the modification issue was not raised, the Court indicated
the allowable limits of judicial review in the following far-from-con-
clusive language: "[The] award is legitimate only so long as it draws
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbi-
trator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no
choice but to refuse enforcement of the award."280
Taken as a whole the broad teaching of Enterprise appears to be
that the courts may examine the plain meaning of the contract or
stipulation to determine whether the arbitrator has exceeded his au-
thority, but that the arbitrator's abuse of discretion must be clear
277. HAYs, LABOR ARBrrRA-ToN: A DissENT n G Vmv 34 (1966).
278. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
279. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
280. Id. at 597. (Emphasis added.)
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and manifest before the award may be set aside on this ground.281
In other words, it would seem that doubts must be resolved in favor
of enforcing the award.282  Beyond this admittedly imprecise guide-
line, of course, each case turns on the language of the particular col-
lective bargaining agreement or submission.
In some instances, however, the answer is relatively simple. The
courts have been quite willing to enforce awards modifying the dis-
charge penalty when the question of the appropriate remedy is sub-
mitted by the parties.2 3 Seemingly, there can be little doubt of the
arbitrator's power and authority when the issue is submitted in terms
of whether "X has been discharged for just cause, and if not what
shall the remedy be"?284 On the other hand, the arbitrator may be
prohibited from ruling on the degree of punishment imposed by man-
agement by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement itself.
281. Lodge 12, IAM v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., supra note 276; Texas Gas
Transmission Corp. v. International Chem. Workers, 200 F. Supp. 521, 528 (W.D. La.
1962); see Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1213-14
(1962).
282. Texas Gas Transmission Co. v. International Chem. Workers, supra note 281.
283. See Local 453, IUEW v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1963).
In this case, the company discharged an employee for violation of a company rule
prohibiting gambling after the employee had been convicted in a county court for
the possession of lottery slips on company premises. The parties submitted the issue
to the arbitrator in these terms: "'Has [X] . . .been discharged for just cause, and if
not what shall the remedy be?'" The arbitrator held that in view of mitigating circum-
stances the penalty was too harsh and ordered the grievant reinstated. Ibid. The district
court while acknowledging the arbitrator's power to make such an award, refused
enforcement on the ground that the award violated public policy. 201 F. Supp. at 218.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the arbitrator was clothed with authority
to determine whether the discharge was for just cause, and thus his award is not
reviewable. The court, however, did say "when public policy is sought to be interposed
as a bar to enforcement of an arbitration award, a court must evaluate its asserted
content." 314 F.2d at 29. Obviously, the court of appeals thought, as did Professor
Fleming, "that the [district] court simply found the arbitrator's award outrageous, and
therefore stretched to find a way out of what it understood the Supreme Court's ruling
to have been in the Enterprise case." Fleming, supra note 281, at 1209. Several
state courts have also refused enforcement of awards contravening public policy.
See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, 299 N.Y. 177,
86 N.E.2d 162 (1949); Publishers Ass'n v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers, 280 App.
Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1952); HAys, op. cit. supra note 277, at 102-05.
284. Professor Gorske believes that "a submission of this type . . .would grant
jurisdiction to the arbitrator to fashion any remedy, including, of course, back pay,
which could be termed reasonably responsive to the injury caused by the breach of
the agreement." Corske, supra note 276, at 19. For an examination of arbitral versatility
in formulating remedies, see ELKotm & ELKOURI, Arbitral Review of Discipline:
Variations in Penalties, in Symosnum ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW 458 (Slovenko ed.
1961). And for an indication of the courts' reaction to unusual remedies, see Arter-
berry v. Lockheed Aircraft Serv., 33 Lab. Arb. 292 (Calif. Super. Ct. 1959) (refusal
to enforce that portion of award ordering grievant to give up his position as union
steward and forbidding him from representing the union in any capacity for a period
of one year); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Guidry, 160 Tex. 139, 327 S.W.2d 406 (1959)
(voiding an award ordering demotion and back pay at the lower job classification).
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In Local 1386, Textile Workers v. American Thread Co.,2m for ex-
ample, the court held that the express provision of the management
prerogative clause to the effect that the employer's exercise of his
reserved rights of discipline might be made the subject of a grievance
and collective bargaining, but not of arbitration, meant " the em-
ployer's established disciplinary practices were not to be upset by an
arbitrator on the ground of inappropriateness."
28 6
Collective bargaining agreements quite often contain clauses limit-
ing the powers of the arbitrator. One of the most common limitations
is that the arbitrator shall not substitute his judgment for that of the
employer. The question becomes whether this phrase, in and of it-
self, is enough to foreclose any review of the penalty assessed by
management. In Local 784, Truck Drivers v. Ulry-Talbert Co.,-8 the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit gave this construction to a
contract clause containing such a phrase. In this case, a trucker was
discharged for falsifying records relating to hours worked. The im-
partial arbitrator, while believing that some measure of discipline
was warranted, felt that the imposition of the discharge penalty was
unduly severe. Acordingly, he ordered the driver reinstated without
back pay. The district court refused enforcement and the court of
appeals affirmed, holding that the following language of the agree-
ment prevented any modification of the discharge penalty:
Section 6. Such arbitration board shall have no power or authority to add
to, subtract from or in any way modify the terms of this Agreement ...
and if any grievance, arising out of any action taken by the Company in
discharging . . . any employee, is carried to arbitration, the arbitration
board shall not substitute its judgment for that of the management and
shall only reverse the action or decision of the management if it finds that
the Company's complaint against the employee is not supported by the
facts, and that management has acted arbitrarily and in bad faith or in
violation of the express terms of the Agreement.28a
Under the express language of this clause it is apparent that the
arbitrator lacked the power to modify the discharge penalty. Although
the court gave effect to the "substitution of judgment" phrase,28 9 its
285. 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961). There was a second ground for refusing to
enforce this award. The arbitrator adopted the report of a former arbitrator which
stated that the company had failed to adequately train card operators without receiving
evidence on this point. In so doing, he went beyond his jurisdiction as fixed by art.
XII, § 7 of the agreement, requiring him to "confine himself strictly to the facts
submitted in the hearing, the evidence before him and the terms of the contract.
Id. at 898.
286. Id. at 900.
287. 330 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964).
288. Id. at 564.
289. "In attempting to go further and in assessing the penalty as 'excessive,' the
arbitrator was attempting to 'substitute .. .[his] judgment for that of the manage-
ment' ...." Id. at 565.
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conclusion was considerably strengthened by other language in the
clause. In this connection, the term "reverse" connotes reinstatement
with full back pay and all rights unimpaired, and, accordingly, is
sufficiently broad to forestall any improvement in the grievant's
status. 0 Moreover, the board was required to find that the "com-
pany's complaint against the employee is not supported by the facts"
as a condition to granting relief. This, of course, requires that the
company prove only the commission of a disciplinary offense. Section
6 empowers the arbitration board to reinstate the grievant only if it
finds that the grievant had not committed the offense charged or that
no discipline whatever is warranted, i.e., the "either/or" approach. It
is clear that the holding of this case must be sustained along these
lines, rather than on the "substitution of judgment" phrase. If the
language discussed above had been omitted, the limitation would
have read: "the arbitration board shall not substitute its judgment for
that of the management and shall only . . . [overturn] the action or
decision if it finds that.., management has acted arbitrarily or in bad
faith. . . ." Under this wording the board clearly would have had
the power to review the penalty imposed to determine its reasonable-
ness. If the "substitution of judgment" language appeared without
any further qualification, however, it probably would prevent the
arbitrator from passing on the appropriateness of the penalty imposed
by management. No case has been found, but it is difficult to escape
the conclusion that the arbitrator is, in fact, substituting his judg-
ment for that of management when he assesses some intermediate
penalty in lieu of discharge.291
A significant number of agreements, although by no means a ma-
jority, stipulate the remedies available to an unjustly discharged
employee. By and large, these will provide for reinstatement with
full back pay and all rights unimpaired, or some such similar relief,
in the event that the arbitrator finds the discharge to be without
cause. In the only reported case found by this writer, Carr v. Kala-
mazoo Vegetable Parchment Co.,292 the Michigan Supreme Court was
called upon to determine whether a similar clause restricted the
arbitrator's power to modify the discharge penalty. There the parties
submitted the issue in terms of whether the grievant's discharge was
"justifiable." The arbitrator found the discharge unjustifiable, but
refused to include back pay in his award because the grievant was
not entirely blameless. The court, reaching the only possible con-
clusion, held that the award of no back pay was without jurisdiction,
void and severable. Under this clause the arbitrator was required
290. American Cyanamid Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 390 (1960) (Singletary, A.).
291. Teele, But No Back Pay Is Awarded, 19 Arn. J. (n.s.) 103, 105 (1964).
292. 354 Mich. 327, 92 N.W.2d 295 (1958).
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to determine only whether -the discharge was justifiable. Once he
had made this determination in favor of the grievant, the express
contract language took over for admeasurement of the grievant's
rights.
The cases analyzed above have dealt with various provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement and the effect these may have
upon the arbitrator's power to mitigate the discharge penalty. In
the event that the agreement or stipulation contains no clause bear-
ing on the power of the arbitrator, the courts have been somewhat
reluctant to vacate awards reducing the discharge penalty on the
ground that it is overly severe. Perhaps the leading authority for
this view is Capital Airways v. Airline Pilots Ass'n,2 where the
court recognized that the just cause provision is not satisfied unless
the penalty bears a reasonable relation to the offense. In this case,
two pilots were discharged for refusing to fly a ferry flight and at-
tempting to smuggle goods into the country to avoid the imposition
of customs duties. The arbitrator, however, found mitigating cir-
cumstances and, while not exonerating the pilots, ordered them re-
instated without back pay. The company sought a declaratory
judgment as to the invalidity of the award, and the union counter-
claimed for its enforcement. The court, in granting the defendant-
union's motion for summary judgment, specifically recognized the
arbitrator's inherent power to pass on the degree of discipline imposed,
stating:
A decision of the company to discharge an employee for misconduct, even
if the employee is guilty, may or may not be for just cause. If the offense
and the circumstances accompanying it are sufficient to warrant such a
penalty, just cause would exist, but it is also true that in many cases such
a penalty may be excessive and unwarranted.Z 4
A number of state courts also have had the opportunity to pass on
the question under consideration. By and large, they usually have
upheld the arbitrator's power to assess an intermediate penalty in
lieu of discharge. This is the case even though the question of the
appropriate remedy may not have been specifically submitted to the
arbitrator, at least in the absence of contractual language to the
293. 237 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Tenn. 1963), modified on other grounds, 341 F.2d
288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 913 (1965).
294. 237 F. Supp. at 377. See also Russ v. Southern Ry., 218 F. Supp. 634 (E.D.
Tenn. 1963). In this case, the court enforced an award of the National Railway Adjust-
ment Board, ordering the reinstatement of a dischargee with partial retroactivity. The
court rejected the carrier's contention "that the Board could not substitute its judgment
for management in matters of discipline." Sanders and Couch, Labor Law-1963
Tennessee Survey, 17 VAND. L. REV. 1091, 1105 (1964).
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contrary. The reasoning used by these courts in reaching this result
is very similar, but two principal theories are discernible.
The implied authority approach is best illustrated by William J.
Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. New Jersey Guards Union,
Inc.9 There the New Jersey Superior Court held that though the
issue is simply whether the grievant was discharged for just cause,
the arbitrator is clothed with an implied power to order reinstate-
ment with or without back pay on the ground that the remedial
power thus implied is necessary to render the award viable. To
similar effect is Samuel Adler, Inc. v. Local 584, Teamsters Union,0 6
where the New York Supreme Court held that although the issue of
reinstatement and its terms may not be expressly submitted, "it is
necessarily implicit in submitting issues that could . . . result in a
finding of improper discharge."297 As to the modification issue, the
court stated: "Since, concededly, the arbitrator had the power to
order reinstatement, there is no reason why a condition could not
be attached."298
Other courts have ordered the enforcement of awards modify-
ing the discharge penalty on a similar but distinguishable theory.
Under this view the issue of just cause is considered apart from
the offense as such, and a finding that the grievant committed
the offense charged does not preclude an award that no just cause
for discharge existed. Although a finding of just cause would pre-
clude the imposition of a lighter penalty in lieu of discharge, the
arbitrator, expressly finding that just cause for discharge was not
established, at the same time may find just cause for the imposition
of a lighter penalty.299 On this basis, the court will enforce an award
substituting an intermediate penalty for that assessed by manage-
ment.3°° It is apparent that this view differs only slightly from that
discussed above and, in any event, the end result is the same.
Under both views the language of the bargaining agreement and
submission is of prime importance, and at times a careless wording of
295. 64 N.J. Super. 301, 165 A.2d 844 (1960); accord, Reading Tube Co. v. Steel
Workers Federation, 20 Lab. Arb. 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1953).
296. 282 App. Div. 142, 122 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1st Dep't 1953), overruling by implication
Simon v. Stag Laundry, 259 App. Div. 106, 18 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1st Dep't 1940).
297. 282 App. Div. at 143, 122 N.Y.S.2d at 9. See also Arterberry v. Lockheed
Aircraft Serv., supra note 284; In re Livingston, 34 Lab. Arb. 653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960);
In re Adler, Inc., 20 Lab. Arb. 546 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953).
298. 282 App. Div. at 143, 122 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
299. Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Local 145, UAW, 140 Conn. 32, 97 A.2d 898 (1953);
Overall v. Delta Refining Co., 207 Tenn. 445, 340 S.W.2d 910 (1960). But see
American Brass Co. v. Local 423, Torrington Brass Workers, 141 Conn. 514, 107 A.2d
255 (1954).
300. Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Local 145, UAW, supra note 299; Overall v. Delta
Refining Co., supra note 299.
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the submission agreement may result in the vacation of an award.
This is strikingly illustrated by Polycast Corp. v. Local 8-102, Oil
Workers,301 a recent Connecticut decision. There the parties sub-
mitted the issue in the following fashion: "Was employee [X] disci-
plined for just cause under the labor agreement. . . ? If not, what
shall the remedy be?"302 X had been discharged and the arbitrator,
while believing the discharge unjustifiable, noted that he was not
without fault and reinstated him without back pay. The court ordered
the award vacated as going beyond the scope of submission, reason-
ing that just cause for some discipline existed and, hence, there was
no occasion to consider the second question of the submission. In
order for either of these views to obtain, therefore, the issue must be
framed in terms of "discharge for just cause."
The obvious question at this juncture is whether these representa-
tive cases will support any broad principle. Certainly, it can be said
that they indicate an awareness of two competing policies. First,
there is the necessity of giving effect to the intentions of the parties
as manifested by the agreement or submission, for the very founda-
tion of the arbitration process continues to be mutual consent.
Second, arbitration must, in fact, provide for the final settlement of
labor disputes if it is to remain a viable instrument for the prevention
of labor strife. The first policy requires rejection of the idea that
the arbitrator sits as a chancellor, possessing broad equitable powers
by virtue of his appointmentm 3 but the second implies a certain lati-
tude in allowing the arbitrator to fashion suitable remedies.304 No
doubt this is what Mr. Justice Douglas had in mind when he ob-
served,
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective
bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in
order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it
comes to formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting
a wide variety of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of
what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular contingency.
Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of
the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own
brand of industrial justice.3 05
In any event, the courts, in trying to give effect to these competing
policies, seemingly will allow the arbitrator some degree of latitude in
formulating appropriate remedies, even in the absence of contractual
301. 59 L.R.R.M. 2572 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965).
302. Ibid.
303. Carr v. Kalamazoo Vegetable Parchment Co., supra note 292, at 327, 92
N.W.2d at 296; Fleming, supra note 281, at 1205.
304. See Lodge 12, 1AM v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., supra note 276.
305. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra note 279, at 597.
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language to guide him. This must be qualified to the extent that
the courts will carefully scrutinize the submission and the collec-
tive agreement to determine whether this power has been denied
the arbitrator by the parties. If no such limitation on the arbitrator's
power appears, the courts will tend to enforce an award of reinstate-
ment with or without back pay.
C. Observations
The courts seem to have arrived at a viable method of determining
the enforceability of arbitration awards affording an unjustly dis-
charged employee less than full relief. By allowing the arbitrator to
order reinstatement with or without back pay unless this power is
specifically forbidden him, they are remaining steadfast to the teach-
ings of Enterprise. That is to say, they are giving the freest possible
rein to the arbitration process, while still giving effect to the inten-
tions of the parties as expressed in the agreement or submission. In
the main, the Enterprise view represents a rational reconciliation of
the competing policies noted above; yet, there can be little doubt
that this view regards the second interest as being the stronger. Thus,
some elaboration on the policy supporting this view would seem
proper.
It is often said that the object of "arbitration is to settle disputes
justly . . . as a substitute for strikes and lockouts," 3 6 and that "this
objective necessarily implies . . . [an] ultimate and complete dis-
position of a discharge grievance."3 7 Clearly, the answer must be no;
for the resulting friction can only harm the bargaining relationship
of the parties. It is just as clear that one of the parties is certain to
be dissatisfied when the arbitrator is empowered to determine only
whether the employee committed an offense justifying discipline,
leaving the degree of punishment solely within the discretion of
management. In so restricting his jurisdiction, the parties leave the
arbitrator with two choices: he may either sustain the discharge
or reinstate the grievant with full back pay and seniority. Given
the reluctance of most arbitrators to find just cause for discharge
"when the employee, in their opinions, does not deserve the ultimate
penalty,"3 8 the arbitrator, in all probability, will come to demand a
far greater degree of proof in order to find that the grievant com-
mitted the offense charged. In most instances, this will lead to full
reinstatement with the concomitant ill effects on plant discipline
and morale that management fears. Even if a particular arbitrator
306. Phillips Chem. Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 721, 722 (1951) (Emery, C.).
307. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 25 Lab. Arb. 634, 638 (1955) (Wyckoff, H.).
308. Note, 2 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 140, 142 (1960).
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does not demand a higher degree of proof and sustains the discharge,
the employer must often contend with dissatisfaction on the part of
the discharged employee's fellow workers who usually will regard
the penalty as being overly severe.30 9 Surely, this black and white
view of the arbitrator's role breeds discontent which, more often than
not, will dilute the purported beneficial effects of the arbitration
process.
It has been noted that in many cases the arbitrator will refuse to
allow a discharge penalty to stand because management has failed
to comply with the technical requirements of the contract, or that
in some fashion it is also at fault.310 Yet, management's complaint
against the employee is usually well founded. Rather than allow the
guilty employee to escape discipline altogether on a technical defense,
the arbitrator sometimes will impose an intermediate sanction in
lieu of discharge.31' In this fashion, the arbitrator is best able to
reconcile the differences of the parties and assure justice in the in-
dividual case. From this standpoint as well, the interests of the parties
are best served by granting the arbitrator the power to formulate
a remedy that may fall short of full reinstatement.
Moreover, by submitting a discharge dispute to arbitration, the
parties concede that they cannot reach agreement. Ideally, they are
referring a highly volatile matter to an expert in industrial relations
uniquely equipped to make an award that will finally resolve their
dispute, representing "such factors as the effect on productivity of
a particular result, its consequence to the morale of the shop . . .
[and] his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or dimin-
ished."31 2 Of course, if the arbitrator is to make an award that will
significantly contribute to the smooth conduct of labor-management
relations, it is apparent that he must have sufficient power to formu-
late an appropriate remedy. Under the Enterprise view a court is
not justified in concluding that the parties intended to restrict the
arbitrator's authority, and thereby deprive themselves of his informed
judgment, merely because it cannot specifically point to an affirma-
tive grant of power in the agreement or submission.
313
309. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
310. See notes 27-45 supra and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., Marathon Elec. Mfg. Co., 64-1 CCH Lab. Arb. J 8082 (1963)
(Shister, J.); Smith's Transfer Corp., 62-3 CCH Lab. Arb. ff 9005 (1963) (Seidenberg,
J.); American Lava Corp., 61-3 CCH Lab. Arb. f[ 8708 (1961) (King, G.).
312. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., supra note 278, at
582.
313. Judge Paul R. Hays, in his Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School, has sharply
disagreed with Mr. Justice Douglas with respect to the arbitrator's proper role in the
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. See HAys, op. cit. supra note 277.
In essence, Judge Hays argues that the parties intend for the arbitrator to base his
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Not only is the approach currently being taken by the courts sus-
tainable on policy grounds, it is inherently logical in view of the
nature of the discharge dispute. In virtually every discharge case,
the union will introduce evidence of mitigating circumstances and
contend that the discharge penalty is overly severe. In fact, as
noted above, the dispute between the parties often involves the rea-
sonableness of the discipline assessed by management, rather than a
controversy over the original facts or whether the grievant's offense was
wrongful. Obviously, the union is protesting that management has
abused its right to discharge for just cause, and this protest con-
stitutes at least one issue the arbitrator is called upon to resolve. To
say that an arbitrator may determine whether the employee involved
committed a disciplinary offense, but the degree of discipline lies
solely within the discretion of management, is to solve nothing, for
it is this very exercise of discretion that the union is protesting. In
this situation, unless the arbitrator's jurisdiction is made an issue and
argued by the parties, it is ridiculous to assert that they did not
intend the arbitrator to rule on the reasonableness of the discharge
penalty, and to reduce it if he finds that it was, in fact, overly severe.
If, on the other hand, the parties wish to restrict the arbitrator's
remedy power, this can be accomplished "by the simple expedient
of adding appropriate language to the contract, including the same in
the submission agreement, or by orally advising the arbitrator that
• . . [they] have so agreed."314 The parties themselves are the best
judges of what will effectuate their own bargaining relationship,
and, therefore, their wishes must govern. To this end the arbitrator
is charged with the duty of scrutinizing the agreement and determin-
ing whether he has the jurisdiction to make an award of no back
pay or partial retroactivity. If he fails to make any such determina-
tion, or makes an erroneous determination, the losing party may find
relief in an action to vacate the award.315 The opposite result would
decision solely on the language of the collective agreement, rather than referring to
such collateral factors as whether tensions would be "heightened or diminished." See
id. at 40-44. See also Davey, The Supreme Court and Arbitration: The Musings of
An Arbitrator, 36 NOTRE DAME LAw. 138, 140 (1961). Specifically, he contends,
"The fact of the matter is that arbitration cases ought to be decided in much the same
manner as any other controversy in which violation of a contract is alleged." HAys, op.
cit. supra at 42. Judge Hays,, a scholar of high repute and no novice to the arbitral
forum, has made a strong argument which deserves careful consideration in relation
to just about every dispute arising under a collective agreement. When applied to the
arbitration of discharge cases, however, this argument fails in light of the peculiar
nature of this dispute. See text directly following this footnote.
314. Horton, The Arbitration of Discharge Cases, 9 Sw. L.J. 332, 340 (1955).
315. But see In re Oil Workers Union, 36 Lab. Arb. 832 (Calif. Super Ct. 1961),
where the court held that an arbitrator's determination that he did not have jurisdiction
to modify the discharge penalty under the contract was final and could not be reviewed
by the court "whether its decision was right or wrong." Id. at 833. To the extent
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amount to a replacement of the collective bargaining process by
arbitration and an elevation of the arbitrator's role to that of a "phi-
losopher king."
VI. CONCLUSION
It is well known and often stated that prior arbitration awards
have little or no precedent value. Factual distinctions, past practices
peculiar to the particular trade or industry, and basic differences in
collective agreements all militate against the development of a co-
hesive body of binding substantive law. During the twenty years
in which arbitration has become a widely accepted means of settling
grievance disputes, however, there has been a definite formulation of
certain basic criteria which are considered "requisite to a just
award."316 With published awards numbering in the thousands, it
is inevitable that the principles announced in prior opinions should
influence the reasoning in subsequent awards. Perhaps the greatest
degree of cohesiveness has been attained in the arbitration of dis-
charge grievances and to a certain extent this is desirable. As stated
by Professor Elkouri:
[A] great contribution to industrial stability lies in the probability that many
disputes are settled by the parties themselves before reaching arbitration
because they are aware of prior awards on the issue involved which point
out the objective merits of contentions and which are indicative of results
likely to be had through arbitration.317
The principles relating to procedural fairness are particularly well
developed. Most arbitrators will agree that prior warning, investiga-
tion and notice are valid conditions precedent to discharge, although
they may differ in some small degree as to the application of
these principles. The concepts of progressive punishment, discrimi-
nation and double jeopardy likewise are evolving in a fairly definite
pattern. In regard to double jeopardy, however, there appears to
be a difference of opinion as to just what action on the part of man-
agement will expose the grievant to punishment or amount to
punishment prior to discharge. The better view requires only that
the supervisor taking the initial action has the power to discharge
the offending employee, and that the action taken purports to be
final in order to bring the doctrine into play.
that this decision implies "that the courts are powerless to set aside an award where
the arbitrator acted in excess of the jurisdiction and powers conferred upon him by
the collective agreement," it is clearly erroneous. See Sanders, Labor Law-1962
Tennessee Survey, 16 VND. L. REV. 792, 794 (1963).
316. Holly, The Arbitration of Discharge Cases: A Case Study, in CRICAL ISSUES
xN LABou AE~rrRAT-oN 1, 17 (Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the
National Academy of Arbitrators 1957).
317. ELKouRI & ELKouRi 265.
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The rules of evidence show a relatively consistent development
with respect to admissibility and self-incrimination. Possibly, arbi-
trators have been overly liberal in admitting evidence of questionable
relevancy, in view of the fact that the opposing party often will feel
obligated to controvert this extraneous matter. The unfairness of
throwing this burden on the adversary underscores the need to draw
more definite boundaries between admissible and inadmissible evi-
dence. Seemingly, the arbitrator should refuse to admit evidence
of those matters which have such little bearing that they would not
normally be considered by the adversary in a thorough preparation
for the hearing. Questions relating to the concepts of "search and
seizure," confessions, and "entrapment" have arisen so seldom that
it is difficult to discern any true pattern other than that they consti-
tute somewhat doubtful defenses. The areas of surprise and con-
frontation show perhaps the greatest divergence of opinion. Arbitrators
have had considerable diliculty in coping with these immense prac-
tical problems, and there is a tendency to resort to makeshift arrange-
ments such as recesses and private consultations to obviate the
unfairness of admitting after-acquired and absentee evidence, re-
spectively. Though such evidence continues to be admitted, arbitrators
have recognized the basic unfairness of doing so, and, accordingly,
appear to be giving somewhat less weight to these forms of evidence.
The impact of the courts' recently expressed interest in the fairness
of arbitral proceedings is still to be felt. Yet, there is a clear indication
that such procedural irregularities as a failure to notify the grievant
of a pending hearing, or refusing him an opportunity to be heard,
will not be tolerated. In view of the severity of the discharge penalty,
it may be assumed that the courts will first assert their authority in
this area. Therefore, it would be advisable for both arbitrators and
the parties to an arbitration proceeding to sacrifice some of the much
vaunted informality in favor of fairly consistent procedures designed
to protect the rights of the dischargee.
The vast majority of arbitrators will refuse to find just cause un-
less the discharge penalty bears some reasonable relation to the
seriousness of the grievant's offense. They believe it to be their
responsibility to determine whether the "punishment fits the crime"
by realistically appraising the wrongful act's deleterious effects on
the industrial community. If the grievant's proven offense appears
to merit discipline short of discharge, the arbitrator usually will feel
compelled to modify the discharge penalty in favor of some lesser
degree of discipline. Since this amounts to a review of the penalty
imposed by management, there is a substantial question as to whether
the arbitrator has this authority. Generally, arbitrators have not been
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